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1. INTRODUCTION 
On November 4, 1979, a group of militant Iranian students, calling themselves 
"Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy," took over the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran.! The seizure climaxed the intense anti-American agitation in Iran 
following the former Shah of Iran's admission into the United States for cancer 
treatment. 2 The militants acted in a purportedly private capacity.3 The Iranian 
Government, however, endorsed the seizure within several days,4 translating the 
"continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of 
that State."5 
After realizing that the hostage crisis would not be quickly resolved, the Carter 
Administration took a number of legal measures designed to impose economic 
and political pressure on Iran. 6 On November 14, 1979, President Carter, 
invoking his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA)/ ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to block the removal of all 
I. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 
I.C.]. 3, May 24,1980 [hereinafter cited asICj judgment]. In addition to seizing the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran, Iranian students also seized the U.S. Consulates in Tabriz and Shariz and held hostage one 
private American citizen and the U.S. diplomatic and consular staffs in Tehran. Id. at 12-13. 
2. The International Court of Justice (IC]) noted in its majority opinion the increasing tension in 
Iran regarding the United States: 
In October 1979, the Government of the United States was contemplating permitting the 
former Shah of Iran, who was then in Mexico, to enter the United States for medical 
treatment. Officials of the United States Government feared that, in the political climate 
prevailing in Iran, the admission of the former Shah might increase the tension already 
existing between the two states, and inter alia result in renewed violence against the United 
States Embassy in Tehran, and it was decided for this reason to request assurances from the 
Government of Iran that adequate protection would be provided. 
IC] judgmem, 1980 I.C.]. at II; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 7, col. I. 
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at AI, col. 5. The Iranian Government of Mahdi Bazargan officially 
promised to do its best to effect the release of the hostages. Id. See also Note, The Effect of Duress on the 
Iranian Hostage Settlement Agreement, 14 VAND.]. TRANsNAT'L L. 847, 859, n.94 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Note, The Effect of Duress]. 
4. IC] judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 33-35. 
5. Id. at 35. The IC] found inter alia that the announced policy of the Ayatollah Khomeini and other 
Iranian authorities to maintain the occupation of the embassy and the detention of the American 
hostages transformed those acts into acts of the Iranian State. Id. 
6. Address by Uoyd N. Cutler, University of Miami School of Law (April 14, 1981), reprinted in 13 
Law. Am. xv, xvi (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cutler Address]. 
7. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 Supp. V 1981). The IEEPA grants extraordinary authority to the 
president during a national emergency. The president, after declaring a national emergency, may 
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Iranian assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 8 Approximately 400 American corpo-
rations immediately commenced litigation in U.S. courts9 against the Govern-
ment of Iran and various of its agencies. The corporate litigants sought pre-
judgment attachments!O of the frozen Iranian assets in order to satisfy potential 
judgments!! "in the event the presidential freeze was revoked and attempts were 
made to return the assets to Iran."!2 
On December 22, 1979, the Carter Administration requested!3 the Security 
prohibit inter alia any "transfer ... of ... any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transaction 
involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest ... with 
respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction ofthe United States." 50 U.S.C. §l702(a)(l)(b) (1976 
& Supp. V 1981). 
8. Exec. Order 12,170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 (1979), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & S,,-~p. V 1981). At the time of 
the freeze, U.S. banks, both domestic and abroad, held a total of $12 billion in Iranian assets. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 19, 1981, at AI, col. I. 
The Executive Order was issued immediately after Bani Sadr, then the finance minister of Iran, 
announced that Iran intended to withdraw all its deposits out of U.S. banks in order to damage the 
dollar. Cutler Address, supra note 6, at xvi-xvii. 
9. The litigation against Iran was authorized by a general license issued by President Carter. Under 
this license, an American litigant could initiate certain judicial proceedings, including prejudgment 
attachments, against Iran but would be unable to obtain any judgment or decree. See 31 C.F.R. 
f 535.504 (1980) (Certain Judicial Proceedings with Respect to .Property of Iran or Iranian Entities); 31 
C.F.R. § 535.418 (1980) (Authorization of Judicial Proceedings under § 535.504). See also Note, Dames & 
Moore v. Regan: Was It Fair?, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 283 (1982). 
Courts founded jurisdiction on the Foreign Sovereign Immunitites Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 
1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976), which confers on U.S. courts personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
over commercial disputes between American citizens and foreign governments based on activities in, or 
causing a direct effect in, the United States. 28 U .S.C. §§ 1332, 1602-1611 (1976). 
10. The purpose of the judicial process of attachment is to seize or block persons or property by 
judicial order to bring them or it under the control of the court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 64. A prejudgment 
attachment is one which is issued before judgment for the purpose of securing assets of the defendent 
that would be necessary to satisfy the potentialjudgment. Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil 
Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Comment, The Iran Case -Eucutive Intervention in 
Private Litigation, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 623, 631 n.52 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Iran 
Case]. 
II. The claims, totaling several billion dollars, ranged from anticipatory breach of contract to 
expropriation. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'1. Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 657 
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan - Rights in Conflict: The Fifth Amendment 
Held Hostage, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 345, 349 [hereinafter cited as Note, Dames & Moore]. 
12. Comment, The Iran Case, supra note 10, at 625, 631. The encumbrances caused by these prejudg-
ment attachments exerted considerable economic pressure on the Iranian government and became a 
central issue throughout the negotiations for the release of the hostages. Cutler, Negotiating the Iranian 
SeU!ement, 67 A.B.A. J. 996 (1981). 
13. U.N. Doc. SlI3705 (1979), letter addressed to the President of the Security Council. There has 
been considerable controversy concerning the wisdom of the United States in bringing the hostage crisis 
to international fora, such as the U. N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Professor 
Alfred Rubin has argued that any judgment by the ICJ or the United Nations would endorse the legal 
correctness of the U.S. position and add weight to the American demand that Iran release the hostages 
immediately. Rubin, The Hostage Incidmt: The United States and Iran, 1982 Y.B. WORLD AFFAIRS 213, 220. 
Accordingly, such international organizations could influence Iran without appearing to favor the 
United States in a political confrontation with Iran. Id. Moreover, any judgment by an international 
organization against Iran would enable the United States to refuse to discuss the return of the Shah or 
any other concession as a quid pro quo for the release of the hostages. Id. 
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Council of the United Nations14 to take certain measures to induce Iran to 
comply with its international obligations. 15 That same month, the Security Coun-
cil unanimously passed two resolutions,16 which called on the Government of 
Iran "to release immediately the personnel of the embassy ofthe United States of 
America being held in Tehran and to provide them protection and to allow them 
to leave the country."17 In addition to bringing its request to the Security 
Council, the United States instituted proceedings against Iran before the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) on November 29, 1979.18 The Court issued 
provisional measures19 against the Government of Iran, effective until final 
judgment.2o The ICJ adopted the following measures: (1) that Iran take imme-
Another international commentor, however, has questioned whether it was actually worthwhile for 
the United States to secure the endorsement of the United Nations. In the eyes of the Iranians, 
this endorsement represented an invalidation of the United Nations as a framework for 
conflict resolution. They perceived the United Nations response as one-sided: the U.N. 
addressed the seizure of the hostages but did not look at either the questions of the Shah's 
crimes against the Iranian people or the complicity of the United States in subverting the 
constitutional order of Iran back in 1953 [by restoring the Shah to power]. 
Address by Richard Falk, The 1980 David Stoffer Lectures, Comments on International Law and the United 
States' Response to the Iranian Revolutwn, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 399 (1981). 
14. The Iranian hostage crisis was originally brought to the attention of the Security Council on 
November 25, 1979, after the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, declared that 
the hostage crisis "posed a serious threat to international peace and security." U.N. Doc. 13,646 (1979). 
The Secretary-General has the authority under Article 99 of the U.N. Charter to "bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international 
peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 99. 
15. The United States submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council that called upon all 
members of the United Nations to impose a sweeping embargo on Iran. This resolution was vetoed by 
the Soviet Union. Cutler, supra note 12, at 996. The United States interpreted this veto to signal the end 
of any help from the Security Council for the duration of the crisis. Rubin, supra note 13, at 217. 
16. The first was passed on December 4,1979: U.N. Sec. Council Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR 24, U.N. 
Doc. S/INF/35 (1979). The second was passed on December 31,1979; U.N. Sec. Council Res. 461, 34 
U.N. SCOR 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979). 
17. U.S. Sec. Council Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR 24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979). 
18. The International Court of justice, the primary judicial organ of the United Nations, was created 
by the U.N. Charter in 1945. U.S. CHARTER arts. 7, 92-96. It is the successor of the Permanent Court of 
International justice and is comprised of 15 judges. At the time the Hostage Case was decided, the 
membership of the Court was as follows: President, Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom); 
Vice-President, Taslim Olauale Elais (Nigeria); and judges Manfred Lachs (Poland), Isaac Forster 
(Senegal), Andre Gros (France), Richard R. Baxter (United States of America), P.D. Morozov (U.S.S.R.), 
jose Sette-Camara (Brazil), jose Maria Ruda (Argentina), Nagendra Singh (India), Abdullah Ali 
EI-Erian (Egypt), Hermann Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Shigeru Oda Oapan), Salah EI Dine 
Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic), and Robert Ago (Italy). ICj judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 3; see also Note, The 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular StaJlin Tehran, II CAL. W. INT'L L.]. 543, n.2 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, United States v. Iran]. 
19. A "provisional measure" is an interim measure of protection which the ICj is authorized to issue 
under Article 41 of the Court's Statute: "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective 
rights of either party." STAT. I.e.]. art. 41(1). The Statute of the ICj is annexed to the U.N. Charter. 
20. 1979-1980I.C.].Y.B. 118-119 (1980), reprinted in 17(1) U.N. CHRONICLE 7 (1980). 
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diate steps to redress the hostage CrISIS by releasing all U.S. nationals held 
hostage and facilitating their departure from Iran; (2) that no member of the 
diplomatic or consular staffs be kept in Iran for purpose of judicial proceedings; 
and (3) that Iran return the Embassy and Consulate premises to the United 
States and make reparation to the United States for damage to those premises.21 
The Court subsequently incorporated these measures into its finaljudgment. 22 
Neither the ICJ decision nor the Security Council's action expedited the end of 
the hostage crisis or the return of the hostagesP After extensive negotiations, 
however, the Government of Algeria announced on January 19, 1981 that the 
United States and Iran had signed the Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (Agreement),24 thereby clearing 
the way for the release of the hostages after 444 days of captivity.25 The Agree-
ment between the United States and Iran consisted of two separate accords. The 
first, the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Repub-
lic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Made by Iran and the United States 
(Declaration),26 required the release of the hostages in return for the release and 
transfer of all frozen Iranian assets. 27 The express purpose of the Declaration 
21. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 44-45. The Court held that since Iran continued to hold the U.S. 
Embassy at the time of the judgment, the form and amount of reparations could not be determined.ld. 
at 42. The form and amount of such reparation would be established by agreement between the parties, 
or, failing such agreement, by the Court. Id. at 45. 
22. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 44-45. The decision was announced on May 24, 1980. The Court 
concluded that the conduct of the Government of Iran in the hostage crisis violated and continued to 
violate obligations owed by it to the United States under international conventions in force between the 
two countries as well as under rules of general international law .Id. at 44. For further discussion of the 
ICJ Judgment, see infra text accompanying notes 144-171. 
23. For a possible explanation of the failure of the United Nations and the ICJ to settle the Iran 
hostage crisis, see supra note 13. 
24. English translation is reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1981). 
25. As an apparent final insult to President Carter, the Iranian Government postponed the actual 
departure of the hostages until 12:25 p.m. EST of January 20, 1981, several minutes after Ronald 
Reagan was inaugurated as Carter's successor. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at I, col. 1. 
Uoyd Cutler, an aide to President Carter during the negotiation, noted that the delay was due to 
ineptitude and internal conflict within the Iranian Government: 
But then came the cruelest delay of all - the four and a half hours it took the Iranians to 
round up the hostages, deliver them to the airport, pass them through hostile crowds, and - in 
my judgment, more because of ineptitude and continuing internal conflict than by plan -
permit President Carter's term to expire before the demon of his hostage crisis had been fully 
exorcised. 
Cutler, supra note 12, at 1000. 
26. English translation is reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Declaration]. 
27. Id. See also, Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 848. Among the provisions, the Declaration 
provided that the United States would not intervene politically or militarily in the affairs of Iran, 
Declaration, supra note 26, at para. 1; the Bank of England would serve as an escrow agent, id. at para. 
2; the United States would transfer to the Bank of England all assets owned by Iran which were in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, id. at para. 4; after certification that all the hostages had safely left 
Iran, Algeria would direct the Algerian Central Bank to direct the Bank of England to forward 
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was "to restore Iran to the financial position it enjoyed prior to the freezing of 
the assets, and to terminate all suits between the two parties and their nation-
als."28 The second accord, the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by Iran 
and the United States (Claims Settlement Agreement),29 provided for the estab-
lishment of an international Arbitral Tribunal to resolve commercial claims30 
raised by the nationals and governments of Iran and the United States against 
e?ch other. 31 
Shortly after the settlement was announced, questions arose concerning both 
the wisdom and constitutionality of the Agreement. Several commentators urged 
the newly inaugurated Reagan Administration to renounce the Agreement on 
the basis that it violated international law.32 More specifically, these com men-
immediately all funds held in escrow, id. at para. 3; the United States would then have six months to 
transfer all assets which were held in domestic branches of U.S. banks to the Bank of England. From 
these assets, an escrow account would be established to satisfy claims of American nationals against the 
Government of Iran, id. at para. 6; if the balance of the escrow account drops below $500 million, Iran 
must replenish the account to maintain the $500 million level, id. at para. 7; the United States must 
revoke trade sanctions against Iran and terminate all pending and future litigation against Iran, 
including the suit before the ICJ and potential claims arising out of the embassy seizure and detention 
of the hostages, id. at paras. 10- II; and the United States would freeze any property of the late Shah of 
Iran and facilitate its recovery by Iran. Id. at paras. 12-16. 
28. Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 848 (footnote omitted). 
29. English translation is reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 230 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Claims Settlement Agreement]. 
30. Article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement excluded from the jurisdiction of the Arbitral 
Tribunal all claims arising out of the embassy seizure and the detention of the hostages that were waived 
in paragraph 11 of the Declaration. Further, claims arising out of contracts providing for exclusive 
dispute resolution by Iranian courts (Iran forum clauses) were also excluded. Claims Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II, para. I. 
31. On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued Executive Orders Nos. 12,276-285 in order to 
implement the Agreement. Those orders included: Direction Relating to Establishment of Escrow 
Accounts, Exec. Order 12,276,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 104 (1982),50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981); Direction to Transfer Iranian Government Assets, Exec. Order 12,277, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 
105 (1982), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Direction to Transfer Iranian Government Assets 
Overseas, Exec. Order 12,278,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 107 (1982), 50 U.S.c. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981); Direction to Transfer Iranian Government Assets Held by Domestic Banks, Exec. Order 12,279, 
3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 109 (1982),50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Direction to Transfer 
Iranian Government Financial Assets Held by Non-Banking Institutions, Exec. Order 12,280,3 C.F.R., 
1981 Comp., p. IIO (1982),50 U.s.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Direction to Transfer Certain 
Iranian Government Assets, Exec. Order 12,281,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. II2 (1982), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving Iran, Exec. Order 
12,282,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 113 (1982),50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Non-Prosecution 
of Claims of Hostages and for Actions at the United States Embassy and Elsewhere, Exec. Order 12,283, 
3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. II4 (1982),50 u.s.c. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Restrictions on the 
Transfer of Property of the Former Shah of Iran, Exec. Order 12,284,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 115 
(1982),50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); and President's Commission on Hostage Compensa-
tion, Exec. Order 12,285,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. II 7 (1982), 50 U.S.c. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
32. Malawer, A Gross Violation of Treaty Law, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 13, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as 
Malawer, A Gross Violation of Treaty Law]; Malawer & Gordon, The Iranian Hostage Agreement: A Debate, 
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tators argued that the acts of the Iranian militants, endorsed by the Iranian 
Government, came within the provisions of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.33 The Law of Treaties, elaborated by the International 
Legal Commission (ILC),34 attempts to define the international obligations of 
sovereign states engaged in making treaties with other nations. 3s One underly-
ing theme of the Vienna Convention is that a treaty is void if a signatory has been 
coerced into giving its consent. Article 52 specifically renders void any treaty 
which has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the U.N. Charter.36 
On February 24, 1981, President Reagan, finding that it was within the overall 
interest of the United States to uphold the Agreement,37 isued an executive 
order38 to implement the Agreement. The order suspended all claims39 which 
could be presented to the Arbitral Tribunal. 40 The claims would be ineffective 
Nat'l L.j., Apr. 20, 1981, at 13, col. I [hereinafter cited as Malawer & Gordon, The Iranian Hostage 
Agreements]. Stuart Malawer argued that by renouncing the Agreement, the Reagan Administration 
would signal to the international community "its abhorrence of the taking of diplomatic hostages and 
the violation of the primary rules of diplomatic and international relations .... " Id. at 15. Moreover, by 
applying international law to the hostage crisis, the Reagan Administration would be affirming its belief 
of the legal correctness of its position. Id. Another international legal commentator, Andreas F. 
Lowenfield, argued that the Agreement should be upheld because international law does not condemn 
a "hostage-taking supported by a Government." Lowenfield, International Law and the Hostage Agreement, 
Wall St. j., Jan. 27, 1981, at 30, col. 3. 
33. U.N. Doc. AlConf. 39/27 (1969). See, e.g., Malawer, A Gross Violation of Treaty Law, supra note 32. 
34. The United Nations established the International Law Commission shortly after the United 
Nation's creation. U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. I(a). The purpose of the ILC is to promote "the 
progressive development of international law and its codification .... " Statute of the International Law 
Commission, art. I, G.A. Res. 174 II, U.N. Doc. Al519, at 105 (1947). 
35. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement Under International and United States Law, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 
822, 826 [hereinafter cited as Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement]. The Law of Treaties is now the 
"principal authoritative source of the law of treaties." L. HENKIN, R. PuGH, O. SCHACTER & SMIT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 580 (1980). [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN]; see also United 
States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); Day v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d 
Cir. 1975), cerl. denied 429 U.S. 890 (1976). 
36. Article 52 of the Law of Treaties is fully discussed in § II infra. 
37. 2048 U.S. DEPT. STATE BULL. 17 (1981), reprinted in Symposium -The Settkment with Iran, 13 LAw. 
AM. I, A-80 (1980) (Appendix) [hereinafter cited as The Settlement with Iran]. The Reagan Administra-
tion stated: 
Id. 
The decision represents a practical judgment that implementation provides the surest resolu-
tion of the. issue consistent with the best interest of the United States in the Gulf region and 
throughout the world. Iran has not profited from these agreements. It was ultimately forced to 
settle on terms that simply restored the status quo ante because the advent of the new 
administration finally confronted it with a serious deadline. 
38. Exec. Order 12,294,3 C.F.R. 1981 Comp., p. 139 (1982), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). 
39. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
40. The Arbitral Tribunal was created in Article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement. See supra 
text accompanying notes 29-30. Article III of the Claims Settlement Agreement establishes the size of 
the Tribunal at nine members: three members each from Iran and the United States and three 
members chosen subsequently by the six U.S. and Iranian members. One of the three neutral members 
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during the suspension.41 Upon a determination of the tribunal that it is without 
jurisdiction over the claim, however, the suspension would be terminated.42 In 
ratifying the Agreement, President Reagan noted the controversy concerning 
the validity of the Agreement under internationallaw,43 but declined to evaluate 
the Agreement according to the international obligations embodied in the U.N. 
Charter and the Vienna Convention. 44 
The Iranian hostage settlement has raised many difficult questions of interna-
tionallaw.45 The United States entered the Agreement with Iran in order to free 
fifty-two citizens who were held hostage by iranian militants for fourteen 
months. If an international judicial body, such as the International Court of 
Justice, had considered the acts of the Iranian militants in holding these hostages 
during treaty negotiations and adjudged them to have been sufficiently coercive 
to invoke Article 52 of the Law of Treaties, then the Agreement would have been 
rendered void. The effect of invalidating the settlement under Article 52 would 
be to terminate all obligations between the United States and Iran that arise from 
the Agreement. Specifically, American nationals would no longer be precluded 
from bringing suits against the Government of Iran for injuries arising out of the 
hostage-taking.46 
This Comment analyzes the legal validity of the Agreement under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 47 Section II discusses whether the taking of 
the American Embassy in Tehran and the holding hostage of American citizens 
for 444 days constituted sufficient "force" to invalidate the Agreement under 
Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. Sections III and IV examine the procedures 
will be chosen as the president of the Tribunal. Claims may be setded by the full tribunal or by a panel of 
three members under the arbitration rules established by the U.N. Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL). Claims Setdement Agreement, supra note 29, at art. III. paras. 1-2. 
41. The suspension was effective only against claims raised in any form other than the Arbitral 
Tribunal. Article II of the Claims Setdement Agreement provides that all claims must be filed with the 
Tribunal no more than one year after the entry in force of the Agreement or six months after the date 
of the selection of the president. Id. at art. III, para. 4. 
42. Exec. Order 12,294,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 139,50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981); see 
also McLaughlin &: Teclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements: A Legal Analysis, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 223, 
225 (1980-81). 
43. See supra note 32. The international validity of the Agreement is discussed in § II infra. 
44. 2048 DEP'T STATE BULL. 17 (1981). "We do not find it necessary to reach a conclusion as to the 
legally binding character of these agreements under international law. We are proceeding because we 
believe it is in the overall interest of the United States to carry out the agreement." Id. 
45. This Comment does not address the various constitutional issues that have. been raised. In 1981, 
me U.S. Supreme Court in Dames ($ Moorev. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), held that the President had tlte -
authority to nullify prejudgment attachments of Iranian assets and to suspend any claims arising out of 
the hostage crisis against the Government of Iran. Dames ($ Moore, 453 U.S. at 669-73, 678-88. The 
Court, however, refused to consider whether the suspension of claims constituted a taking of property 
without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. Id. at 688-90. 
46. The Declaration precludes any potential claim brought by an American national against the 
Iranian Government arising out of the embassy seizure and detention of the hostages. See supra note 26. 
47. The Law of Treaties is discussed in detail in § II infra. 
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for invalidating a treaty under Article 52 and the legal effects of such an 
invalidation. Section V discusses the effects that the Agreement has had on the 
different categories of litigants4~ that have attempted to bring claims against the 
Government of Iran. Finally, section VI demonstrates that any claimant who 
does not receive full compensation from the Government of Iran may seek 
compensation from the United States under the fifth amendment's Just Com-
pensation Clause. 49 
11. THE VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER THE LAW OF TREATIES 
A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1. Background and Purpose 
In 1949, the International Law Commission (ILC) began to codify the Law of 
Treaties. 50 After almost two decades of discussions and preliminary drafts, the 
lLC presented its final draft to the U.N. General Assembly in 1966.51 After 
approving the Commission's work, the General Assembly voted to hold the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1968-69.52 The Law of Treaties53 
was adopted on May 22, 1969 and opened for signature the following day.54 
One of the central purposes of Article 52 of the Law of Treaties is to recognize 
the changing role of war as a foreign policy tool in settling international dis-
putes.55 The traditional doctrine which existed prior to the Covenant of the 
48. Paragraphs II to 17 of the Agreement dispose of all claims that American nationals have against 
the Government of Iran. See supra note 27. These provisions treat the three different categories of 
claimants - former hostages, banks, and contract claimants - differently. Contract claimants, whose 
contracts do not contain choice-of-forum clauses, may bring commercial claims before the Arbitral 
Tribunal established by the Claims Settlement Agreement. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 
29, at art. II, para. i. The claims of former hostages are completely abrogated. The banks with loans 
outstanding to Iranian borrowers may offset these debts against the Iranian assets that were on deposit 
with those banks at the time of the Agreement. See Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 
859. 
49. The 'Just compensation" clause of the fifth amendment provides: " ... nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
50. Malawer, A New Concept ofClmSent and World Public Order: "Coerced Treaties" and the Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 4 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I, 5 n.13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Malawer, Coerced 
Treaties]. 
51. U.N. Doc. NCN.4ISER.NI966. 
52. U.N. Res. 2166, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 99, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966). 
53. U.N. Doc. NConf.39127 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969); 8 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 679 (1969). 
54. The Llw of Treaties did not become effective until January 27, 1980, approximately one month 
after Togo became the 35th State to ratify the Conventio.n. U.N. Multilateral Treaties, List of Signa-
tures, Ratification, Accession, etc. as of Dec. 31, 1979, U.N. Doc. ST/LEGISER.D/13 (1980) at 597-98. 
55. (1953) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 90,147, U.N. Doc. NCN.4I63/1953. Lluterpacht, Special Rappor-
teur to the ILC on the Llw of Treaties, states: "The object of this article [Article 52] is to declare the 
validity in the sphere of international law, of a general principle of law ... [which recognizes] the 
renunciation and prohibition of the use of force in general international agreements .... " Id. 
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League of Nations "permitted recourse to war not only as a means of enforcing 
rights recognized by international law but also for the purpose of challenging 
and destroying the existing legal rights of states."56 If international law per-
mitted recourse to war, then international law recognized a priori the status quo 
post bellum resulting from the successful pursuit of war.57 Accordingly, the 
validity of a treaty was not affected by the fact that it was brought about by the 
threat or use of force.5~ 
With the enactment of the Covenant of the League of Nations59 and the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Pact of Paris),60 a strong body of 
opinion began to develop which held that every state has the duty to refrain from 
the use of war as an instrument of national policy.61 Insofar as war or threats of 
force constitute internationally illegal acts, the results of those illegalities, im-
posed treaties, cannot be considered valid, nor do they produce legal rights that 
would benefit the lawbreaker.62 The developments in international law refusing 
to recognize the validity of war were codified into the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) 
of the Charter63 prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state. Article 2(4) represents a general rule of 
internationallaw64 and was the precursor to Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. 65 
Article 52 of the Law of Treaties declares void any treaty which was procured 
by the threat or use of force. 66 For the purposes of Article 52, "unlawful force" is 
defined as that force which is in "violation of the principles of the United 
Nations."67 The rationale behind Article 52 is that any treaty under duress is 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. Although the Covenant did not abolish the right of war, "it prohibited recourse to it prior to the 
exhaustion of means of pacific settlement. ... " Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 147. Accordingly, the 
recourse to war was unlawful to the extent that it violated the obligations established by the Covenant. 
Id. 
60. Aug. 27, 1928,46 Stat. 2343, T.S. 796,94 L.N.T.S. 57. The parties to the Pact of Paris renounced 
recourse to war, as an instrument of national policy, in their relations to one another. The legal effect of 
the treaty was "that war could no longer be resorted to either as a legal remedy or as an instrument for 
changing the law." Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 147. 
61. Houben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 
61 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 705 (1967). 
62. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 148. 
63. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 
para. 4. 
64. See Houben, supra note 61, at 705. 
65. See Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 149. 
66. Article 52, "Coercion of a State by the Threat or Use of Force," provides that: "A treaty is void if 
its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. NConf.39/27 (1969). 
67. [1966]1(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30, 34, U.N. Doc. NCN.41183 and Add.I-3/1966 (statement by 
Mr. Ago, Italy). 
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vitiated by the absence of consent; such a treaty is considered a nullity.68 One 
overriding fear of many jurists was that to recognize the prohibition against 
coerced treaties would encourage unfounded assertions of coercion. 69 Although 
the Commission considered this objection, it felt that such an apprehension was 
not a valid ground for refusing to update treaty law to coincide with other 
branches of international law. 70 
2. Whether the Law of Treaties is Applicable to the Iranian Hostage 
Settlement 
Neither the United States nor Iran ratified or acceded to the Vienna Conven-
tion. 71 Therefore, the prohibitions of Article 52 would be binding upon the 
United States and Iran only if the article is considered to be declaratory of 
international law, and thereby automatically applicable to all states. 72 A multilat-
eral treaty is considered declaratory of customary international law if "it incor-
porat[es] and giv[es] recognition to a rule of customary international law that 
existed prior to the conclusion of the treaty ... :;73 One method to show that a 
treaty, or a particular article of a treaty, is declaratory of international law is to 
show that the travaux preparatoires of that article express the intention that it is 
meant to be declaratory of international law. 74 
The ILC clearly indicated that in formulating Article 52 it was "codifying, not 
developing, the law of nations in one of its most essential aspects."75 Most of the 
members of the Commission noted that the prohibition against coerced treaties 
arose from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, thereby constituting a rule that 
68. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151-52. Another commentator noted that Article 52 was meant to 
prevent anti pacific conduct in the world community: 
The rationale underlying the article is that while a nation may feel compelled to make an 
international agreement under duress in order to end another nation's offensive conduct, the 
vict.imi~ed nation and the ~ntire world community have a large stake in preventing the 
antJpaClfic conduct from bemg rewarded. The theory is that nations will be deterred from 
using or threatening force to elicit concessions if they know that a concession can later be 
retracted. 
Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 828. 
69. See Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 21; [1966]2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, U.N. Doc. 
NCN.4/183 and Add.I-3/1966. 
70. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 246, U.N. Doc. NCN.4I183 and Add. 1-3/1966. 
71. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions 
598, U.N. Doc. ST/LEGISER.D/13 [1980); see also Letter from Robert F. Turner, Void Ab Initio: The 
United States-Iran Hostage Accords, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 347, 349 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Turner, The 
U.S.-Iran Accords). 
72. See L. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 580. 
73. Baxter,Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, [1965-1966) BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 275, 277 (1968). See also Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 860. 
74. Id. 
75. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151. 
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predated their discussion of Article 52.76 Moreover, in its report to the United 
Nations, the ILC reiterated that "[t]he invalidity of the threat or use of force is a 
principle which is lex lata in the international law of today."77 Accordingly, the 
ILC understood Article 52 to be a codification of a rule of international law 
which was established prior to the Vienna Convention.78 As a statement of 
customary international law, Article 52 is binding on all states, whether or not 
they ratified the Vienna Convention. 79 Therefore, the prohibition against 
coerced treaties found in Article 52 is applicable to the Iranian hostage settle-
ment. 80 
B. The Definition of Force under Article 52 
l. Introduction 
This section analyzes the definition of force in Article 52 to determine whether 
the acts of the Iranian militants constituted sufficient force to subject the Iranian 
hostage settlement to the prohibitions of that Article. Article 52 holds any treaty 
void "if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations."81 The failure of Article 52 to delineate clearly the parameters of the 
phrase "threat or use of force"82 has precipitated considerable controversy 
concerning the type of force sufficient to invalidate a treaty. 83 There was a major 
division within the ILC as to whether "force" encompassed economic and politi-
cal pressures,84 as argued by Third World and Communist bloc countries,85 or 
76. [1963] 1(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 52, U.N. Doc. AlCN.41156.'1963 (statement of Mr. Rosenne, 
Israel); Summary Records of the 827th Meeting, [1966] 1(1) Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/1S3 and Add.1-3/1966. See also Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 861. 
77. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No.9), U.N. Doc. Al5509 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 197, U.N. Doc. AI 
CN .41SER.All9631 Add.l. 
78. For a history of the development of the rule prohibiting coerced treaties, see supra text accom-
panying notes 59-65. 
79. See supra note 72. 
In his report on the Law of Treaties, Lauterpacht noted that any member of the United Nations-
even those which do not ratify the Law of Treaties - may attempt to invalidate a coerced treaty under 
Article 52: "[Article 52] gives to every member of the United Nations - whether it has become a party 
to the Code of the Law of Treaties or not - the right to ask the [ICJ] to declare, in contentious 
proceedings, the invalidity of a treaty imposed by force." Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151. 
80. See Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 863; Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 
35, at 827. 
81. U.N. Doc. AlConf.39127 (1969) at 25. 
82. Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 16. 
83.Id. 
84. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. Al5746 (1964) at 20 (Proposal of Yugoslavia): "States shall ... desist from 
resorting to, or relying upon, force in any of its forms in their relations with other States, and from 
exerting pressure, whether by military, political, economic, or any other means, against the political 
independence or territorial integrity of any State." Id. (emphasis added). Although this proposal was not 
offered in the context of the Law of Treaties, it generally represents the proposals that Third World 
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merely physical force, as asserted by several Western, industrialized countries. H6 
Third World countries sought to expand the definition of "force" to include 
economic and political coercion.87 These states argued that the purpose of both 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and Article 52 of the Law of Treaties was inter 
alia to protect the political independence of sovereign nations. 88 Therefore, any 
form of pressure, including those of political or economic character which have 
the effect of threatening the integrity or political independence of a state, would 
violate the purpose of Article 52.89 Clearly, these countries argued, the political 
independence of a nation could be threatened equally by economic and political 
pressure as by armed force. 9o 
Western nations favored a narrower definition of "force." These states as-
serted that" 'political and economic pressure,' however reprehensible it might 
be, had not yet been sufficiently established in law to be incorporated into the 
convention as a ground for invalidating a treaty .... "91 The effect of incorporat-
ing such vague terms into a provision allowing for the invalidation of treaties 
would seriously endanger the stability of treaty relations.92 Moreover, Western 
delegates argued that any breach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, as incorpo-
rated into Article 52, would give rise to the right of self~defense in accord with 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.93 Clearly, Western nations argued, the framers of 
and Communist bloc countries presented in the ILC. See generally [1966]2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 15-18, 
U.N. Doc. NCN.41183 and Add. 1-411966. 
85. These states included a majority of African and Asian nations, some Latin American nations, and 
the Eastern Bloc. Rosenstock, The Declaratirm of Principles of lnternatirmal Law Crmcerning Friendly Rela-
tions: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 724 (1973). 
86. See [1966]2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 15-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41183 and Add. 1-411966; [1966]1(1) 
Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 28-29, U.N. Doc. NCN.41183 and Add. 1-2/1966. See also Malawer, Coerced 
Treaties, supra note 50, at 16-31; Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 963-69. 
87. Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 16-17. 
88. U.N. Doc. N623011966 at 23; see also Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 724. 
89. Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 724. 
90. U.N. Conf. on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968, Official 
Records, U.N. Doc. NConf.39/11 at 274 (1969) (statement by Mr. EI-Dessauki, UAR). Mr. EI-Dessauki 
argued that economic pressure, such as blockades or embargoes, could be more effective than the threat 
or use of military pressure in reducing the country's power of self-determination, especially if its 
economy depends upon one crop or export product. ld. 
91. U.N. Conf. on the Law of Treaties, Second Session Vienna, 9 April-22 May 1969, Official 
Records, U.N. Doc. NConf.39/II/Add.1 at lOl (1970) (statement by Mr. Tesuruoku, Japan). 
92. Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 23. Malawer argued that "[i]f 'coercion' was [sic] to be 
regarded as extending to political and economic pressure, the door to evasion of treaty obligations 
might be opened very wide because these forms of coercion are much less capable of definition and 
much more liable to subjective interpretations." [d. Malawer supported this argument with an interpre-
tation of the commentary of Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock to the effect that the prohibi-
tion against coerced treaties would not involve undue risks to the stability of treaty negotiations unless 
"coercion" included acts other than the use or threat of physical force. Waldock, (Second) Report on the 
Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, U.N. Doc. NCN.4115611963. 
93. Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 724. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads, in pertinent part: 
"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. CHAI\TEI\ art. 51. 
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the Charter had not intended to give rise to such a right In response to non-
physical acts such as economic pressure. 94 
2. Positions Adopted at the Vienna Convention 
In its final draft of the Law of Treaties,95 the Commission defined "coercion" 
94. The ILC debated the precise scope of Article 52 throughout its discussion on the Law of Treaties. 
Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, the first Special Rapporteur to the ILC to discuss Article 52, addressed the 
question of what degree of force would be necessary to invalidate an "imposed treaty." Lauterpacht. 
supra note 55. at 147. Lauterpacht interpreted the phrase "by or as the result of force or threats of 
force." to express the principle "that coercion. however indirect. if resulting from unlawful recourse to 
force or threats of force invalidates a treaty." [d. at 149. Lauterpacht further commented on the amount 
of force that would be sufficient to invalidate a treaty: 
[d. 
[A] treaty is invalid if a State. as the result of unlawful use of force has been reduced to such a 
degree of impotence to be unable to resist the pressure to become a party to a treaty although 
at the time of the signature no obvious attempt is made to impose upon it by force the treaty in 
question. 
Although the commentary expressly states that the term "force" referred to physical force and threats 
of physical force as distinguished from other forms of coercion. Lauterpacht speculated that forms of 
economic and political pressure could be just as destabilizing to treaty negotiations as the use of physical 
force. [d. Lauterpacht concluded: 
!d. 
[I]n cases such as attempts to starve a State into submission by cutting off its imports or its 
access to the sea. although no physical force is used directly against persons[.] it may be difficult 
to deny that the treaty must be deemed to have been concluded as the result of the use of force 
or threats of force. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. the Special Rapporteur following Lauterpacht, preferred a far narrower 
interpretation of the force necessary to invalidate a treaty under Article 52. Fitzmaurice. (Third) Report 
on the Law of Treaties. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 20. 38. U.N. Doc. A/CN.41115/1958. Fitzmaurice. 
fearful that allowing "imposed treaties" to be invalidated would pose a serious threat to the treaty-
making process. urged restrictions upon the type of force that might lead to the invalidation of a treaty: 
The case must evidently be confined to the use or threat of physical force. since there are all too 
numerous ways in which a State might allege that it had been induced to enter into a treaty by 
pressure of some kind (for example. economic) on this latter basis. a dangerously wide door to 
the invalidation of treaties. and hence a threat to the stability of the treaty-making process. 
would be opened. 
!d. (emphasis in the original). Accordingly. Fitzmaurice differed with Lauterpacht to the extent of 
confining the prohibitions of Article 52 to only the treaty or use of physical force. 
Sir Humphrey Waldock. the third Special Rapporteur to discuss Article 52. agreed with Fitzmaurice 
and argued that the prohibition against coerced treaties would not include those which have been 
imposed by political or economic coercion. Waldock. supra note 92. at 36. Waldock was concerned that 
the term "political and economic coercion" was incapable of precise definition and that to allow 
invalidation on the grounds would enhance illegitimate attempts to evade treaty obligations. [d. More-
over. Waldock argued that "the operation of political and economic pressures is part of the normal 
working of the relations between states. especially in international economic relations." Malawer. Coerced 
Treat~s, supra note 50. at 23. Therefore. according to Waldock, the expansion of the term "force" to 
include political and economic coercion would not only destabilize treaty relations by encouraging 
unfounded challenges to treaty obligations, but also interfere with normal working relations between 
states. 
95. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/19661Add.1. The final draft of Article 
49 [52] read: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." [d. At the Vienna Convention. 
Bulgaria and thirteen other states successfully amended the ILC's draft as follows: "A treaty is void if its 
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international 
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in terms of "a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations,"96 and left the precise scope of this definition to subse-
quent interpretation. 97 At the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Third World countries renewed their effort to expand the scope of "force" as 
used in Article 52.98 Nineteen states99 proposed an amendment (Nineteen State 
Amendment) to the ILC text to expand the definition of the phrase "threat or 
use of force" so as to include the prohibition against political and economic 
pressure. IOO After substantial private negotiations,lol the Nineteen State 
Amendment was withdrawn. As part of the compromise, Western states agreed 
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. NConf.39/C.1IL.289/Add. I. (emphasis 
added). 
96. U.N. Doc. NConf.39/27 (1969). One frequent criticism of Article 52 is that it would nullify peace 
treaties imposed upon an aggressor. See, e.g. Cutler Address, supra note 6, at xxi. This criticism, 
however, is not a valid interpretation of the Article, which prohibits only the use of force in violation of 
the principles of the United Nations. International law recognizes proper, legal exercises of force that 
would not violate the principles of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 51; The Principle 
That States Shall Refrain in their International Relations From the Threat or Use of Force Against the 
Territorial Integrity or Political Independence of any State, or in Any Other Manner Inconsistent with 
the Purpose of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. N5746 at 39-44 (1964). For thorough discussions of 
permissible uses of force in international relations, see 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 1-311 (1971); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 214-349a 
(1963). These exercises of force include: (I) the use of force on the decision of a competent organ of the 
United Nations (e.g., pursuant to a decision of the Security Council); (2) the use offorce on the decision 
of a regional agency when that agency acts in accord with the Charter; (3) the use of force in exercising 
the right of self-determination against colonial domination; and (4) the use of force in the exercise of 
the right to self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Doc. N5746, at 39-44 
(1964). Article 51 of the U.N. Charter limits the right to self-defense to cases in which armed force has 
occurred, to the exclusion of every other act, including provocation. Furthermore, it prevents the 
exercise of the right of self-defense only until such time as the Security Council has taken all measures to 
maintain international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
97. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 246, U.N. Doc. NCN.4!18611966/Add.1. 
98. Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 16-17. See also Note, The Effect of Duress,supra note 3, at 
867. 
99. Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Congo, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Mali, Pakistan, Sierre Leone, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, 
Zambia. U.N. Doc. NConf.39/C.I/L.67/Rev.lICorr.1 (1968). 
100. The draft amendment provided that "[a] treaty is void ifits conclusion has been procured by the 
threat or use of force, including economic and political pressure, in violation of the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. NConf.39/C.1IL.67/Rev.lICorr. I, Reports of the Committee of the 
whole, U.N. Doc. NConf.39/14 (1969) (emphasis added). See also Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 
50, at 17. 
101. One commentator noted the extent of the private negotiations: 
The course of the debate had made it clear that if the amendment were put to the vote it would 
carry by quite a substantial majority. On the other hand, in private discussions it had been 
made quite clear to the proponents that adoption could wreck the conference because states 
concerned with the stability of treaties found the proposal intolerable. 
To reduce tension, discussion of the article was adjourned and private negotiations resorted 
to. A compromise solution was reached after some days of cooling off. The amendment was 
withdrawn. In its place, a draft declaration condemning threat or use of pressure in any form 
by a state to coerce any other state to conclude a treaty was unanimously adopted by the 
committee. 
Kearney & Dalton, The Treatv on Treaties, 64 AM. I. INT'L L. 495, 534-35 (footnotes omitted). 
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to include into the Final Act of the Conference the "Declaration on the Prohibi-
tion of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion ofTreaties,"102 
which provides that: 
[The Conference) solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure 
in any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any State in 
order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the 
conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign 
equality of States and freedom of consent. I03 
The result of incorporating this language into the Final Act was to create "a 
vague loophole in the Draft Article 49 [52)."104 The official language of Article 
52 prohibits only that force in violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter. 
Although the commentary of Article 52 defines this phrase to prohibit only 
physical force, the declaration inserted into the Final Act arguably expands the 
"use of force" to include political and economic pressure. 105 Therefore, the 
precise scope of the acts prohibited by Article 52 was not clearly defined at the 
Vienna Convention. 
3. Subsequent Interpretation of the Definition of "Force" as used in the U.N. 
Charter 
a. Draft Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States 
When determining whether to apply Article 52 to the Iranian hostage settle-
ment, one must also consider interpretations of the definition of force subse-
quent to Article 52 to determine whether the acts of the Iranian Government are 
prohibited. The Draft Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States l06 is one important in-
terpretation of the definition of "force" as employed in Article 52. 
In 1963, the U.N. General Assembly established the Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States l07 and instructed it to evaluate several basic principles of interna-
102. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. NConf.39/26 
(1971). The dralt, submitted by the Netherlands, was adopted without formal vote. See Malawer, Coerced 
Treatres, supra note 50, at 18. 
103. Id. 
104. Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 22. 
105. See U.N. Conf. on the Law of Treaties, Second Session Vienna, 9 April-22 May 1969, Official 
Records, U.N. Doc. NConf.3911I1Add.1 at 100 (1970) (statement of Mr. Mutole, Republic of the 
Congo). But see id. at 101 (statement of Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands). See generally Malawer, Coerced 
Treatres, supra note 50, at 17-20. 
106. U.N. Doc. NA.C.125/SR.86 (1970). See also G.A. Res. 2625 (xxv), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
28) 121, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly Relations Declaration]. 
107. G.A. Res. 1815(xvii), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 66, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). The 
thirty-one member Special Commission consisted of: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Burma, Cameroon, 
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tionallaw,l°M including the prohibition of the use of coercion in treaty negotia-
tions. lo9 The Special Commission. adopting the general wording of Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter. concluded that "States shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State. or in any matter inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations."llo The Friendly Relations Declaration is im-
portant not only for its definition of force but also for its enunciation of those 
contexts in which force is outlawed.11l The concept of force adopted by the 
Special Commission "goes beyond armed attack on the territory of another 
state;"112 the Principles prohibit "acts of reprisal involving the use of force." and 
resort to force "as a means of solving international disputes." and terrorist 
attacks. 113 
Utilizing the Friendly Relations Declaration to interpret Article 52 of the Law 
of Treaties presents several problems. First. the Commission intended that any 
decisions would be made by unanimity rather than by majority vote. 114 Accord-
Chile. Czechoslovakia. Dahomey. Ghana. Guatemala. India. Italy.Japan. Kenya. Lebanon. Madagascar. 
Mexico. Netherlands. Nigeria. Poland. Romania. Sweden. Syria. U.S.S.R .• United Arab Republic. 
United States. United Kingdom. Venezuela. and Yugoslavia. Note. Tlu D~claration of Friendly R~lations. 
12 HARV. INT'L L. J. 509, n.3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note. Declaration of Friendly R~lationsl. 
108. The principles cover: "non-use of force. peaceful settlement of disputes. non-intervention of 
states in the domestic jurisdiction of other states. cooperation among states. equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. sovereign equality, and fulfillment in good faith of obligations assumed in 
accordance with the Charter." Id. at 509. 
109. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970). The first 
principle that the United Nations General Assembly requested the Special Commission to consider 
read: "The Principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any matter inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations." /d. 
Members of the ILC were well aware that the Special Commission was considering simultaneously 
with its own deliberations the definition of force with respect to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. 
Conf. on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 Mar.-24 May 1968, Official Records. U.N. Doc. 
NConf.39111 at 289 (1969) (statement of Mr. Marescu, Italy). Western States at the ILC argued that it 
was improper for the ILC to expand the definition of force to include economic and political pressure 
because such an expansion would amount to an interpretation of the U.N. Charter. a task assigned only 
to the Special Commission. Id. S~e also Note. Tlu Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 869, 874-76. Accord-
ingly. to the extent that the ILC deferred to the work of the Special Commission, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration may provide crucial insight to the definition of force as used in Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter and Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. S~e Note. Th~ Effect of Duress, supra note 3. at 874-75. 
1l0. Friendly Relations Declaration. supra note 106. art. I. 
Ill. Note. Th~ Iranian Hostag~ Agrummt, supra note 35. at 833. 
ll2. [d. 
ll3. G.A. Res. 2625. 25 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 28) 122. U.N. Doc. N802811970. The Principles 
prohibit a state from "organizing. instigating. assisting or participating in ... terrorist acts in another 
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such 
acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involved a threat or use of force." [d. at 123. 
The Principles further prohibit a state from "organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular 
forces or armed bands. including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state." [d. 
ll4. Rosenstock, supra note 85. at 713-14. 
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ingly, the Commission had difficulty in finding language that would be meaning-
ful yet acceptable to the different political and economic interests represented, 
including not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also other Euro-
pean, African, and Latin American states as wellY5 Second, the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration is not considered treaty lawl16 and therefore represents more a 
recommendation than a statement of legally binding rules. 1l7 
Political considerations, dictated by the various ideologies represented in the 
Special Commission, may have prevented the Commission from defining "force" 
with more precision. The generality of the Declaration's language, however, 
should not preclude its application to the Iranian hostage settlement. The 
Declaration specifically enumerates prohibited uses of force, including acts of 
terrorism, such as hostage-taking, and armed attacks on another country's dip-
lomatic premisesYH These prohibitions are directly applicable to the acts of' the 
Iranian militants. Any problems in interpreting the language of the Declaration 
are overcome by the specificity of these prohibitions. 
Similarly, the Declaration's doubtful weight as treaty law should not prevent its 
application when evaluating the validity of a tainted treaty. The U.N. General 
Assembly established the Special Commission to evaluate several major princi-
ples of the U.N. Charter, including the prohibition of the use of force in treaty 
negotiations. ll9 With this instruction from the General Assembly, the Commis-
sion formulated authoritative interpretations of several principles, including the 
definition of force. Although not considered treaty law, the Declaration is con-
sidered "the most important single statement representing what members of the 
United Nations agree to be the law of the Charter on these ... principles."12o 
Therefore, the Declaration should be considered to be an authoritative state-
ment of the international community and binding as statements creating norms 
of international behavior.121 
b. The Definition of Aggression 
The Definition of Aggression122 is a second interpretive document of Article 
115. [d. "Thus, given the diverse ideological and economic philosophies represented, political 
exigencies often dictated textual compromises and omissions." Note, Declaration of Friendly Relations, 
supra note 107, at 509. 
116. One member of the United Nations noted that the Declaration would not have the status of a 
treaty nor would it be considered jus eogens. Rather, the Declaration would be characterized among 
"general principles of international law." U.N. Doc. NC.61SR.1180 (statement by Mr. Csatarday, 
Hungary). See also Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 714, nA. 
117. Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 714-15. 
ll8. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
ll9. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
120. Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 714. 
121. See Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 33, n.79. Malawer refers not to the Friendly 
Relations Declaration but to similar declarations which would have similar weight under international 
law. [d. 
122. G.A. Res. 3314(xxix), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974) 
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2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The Definition, which was adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1974, enumerates a non-exhaustive123 list of acts of aggression 
which violate the principles ofthe U.N. Charter. 124 Article 1 defines "aggression" 
as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations .... "125 
Although its language is similar to that of Article 52, the Definition of Aggres-
sion is more comprehensive in that it refers to specific acts of prohibited force. 
Among the forbidden acts listed in Article 3,126 paragraphs 3(d) and 3(g) are 
relevant to the Iranian hostage crisis. Article 3(d) included within the Definition 
of Aggression "[a]n attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another state."127 Article 3(g) includes "[t]he 
sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mer-
cenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state .... "12H In 
addition, the Definition requires that an illegal act offorce constitute an act, such 
as an actual invasion or annexation, which is more grievous and unambiguous 
than the mere threatening of a state's "territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence."129 
The Definition of Aggression narrowly interprets the defimtion of "force." 
Although its general language is similar to that of Article 52,130 the Definition 
emphasizes only the prohibition of unambiguous acts of physical force. 131 Arti-
cles 3(d) and 3(g), which prohibit armed attacks against other states, enumerate 
examples of other types of force that the Definition declares illegal. Political and 
[hereinafter cited as Definition]. The Definition was adopted primarily for use by the Security <puncil 
in its enforcement activities. Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 877. These enforcement activities 
include determining "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42 [of the U.N. Charter], to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER 
art. 39. 
123. The Definition provides: "The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security 
Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter." 
Definition, supra note 122, art. 4. 
124. Acts of aggression, defined within Article 3 of the Definition, are: "invasion and annexation of 
territory, bombardment or use of weapons against another state's territory, blockade, violation of a 
troop sanctioning agreement, and allowing territory to be used for aggression against a third state." 
Note, The Effect oj Duress, supra note 3, at 878, citing article 3 of the Definition (footnotes omitted). 
125. Definition, supra note 122, art. 1. 
126. See supra note 124. 
127. Definition, supra note 122, art. 3(d). 
128. [d. at art. 3(g). For the purposes of the Definition, embassy grounds constitute state territory. 
Malawer, A Gross Violation of Treaty Law, supra note 32, at 13, col. 1. 
Article 3 is qualified by Article 7, which provides that nothing in the Definition may "prejudice the 
right of self-determination ... of peoples forcibly deprived of that right ... nor the right of these people 
to struggle to that end." Definition, supra note 122, art. 7. 
129. !d. at art. 1. See also Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 879. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
131. Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 879. 
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economic coercion, which certain members of the ILC argued were vague 
concepts incapable of precise definition,132 would apparently not constitute 
illegal uses of force. The Definition, with its emphasis on the prohibition of 
armed force, apparently limits the grounds by which a treaty may be invalidated 
under Article 52 of the Law of Treaties to the use of physical force. 
C. Conclusion 
Article 52 of the Law of Treaties, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, and the Definition of Aggression constitute a combinati~n 
of statements by the United Nations and the international community condemn-
ing the threat or use of force to settle international disputes. These statements 
establish "an almost absolute obligation to avoid the use of force in settling 
disputes."133 Although the commentary of Article 52 specifically prohibits only 
the use of physical force, considerable controversy exists as to whether acts of 
political and economic coercion are included within such prohibitions. 
The controversy concerning the parameters of the definition of force arose in 
the ILC. Third World countries sought to expand the definition of force to 
include political and economic coercion. For these countries, which have been 
characterized by struggling economies, such acts of coercion could constitute a 
more serious threat to their independence than acts of physical force. 134 If the 
purpose of Article 52 is to protect the political independence of sovereign 
nations, 135 Third World countries argued, then it would be inconsistent with that 
Article to prohibit acts which could constitute a threat to a nation's sovereignty, 
such as political or economic coercion. 
The major concern of the drafters of Article 52, however, was that it might 
encourage the invalidation of treaties on the basis of unfounded assertions of 
coercion. 136 Accordingly, Article 52 should be read to prohibit only clearly 
defined uses of force. Acts of political and economic coercion are too imprecise 
to be the basis for invalidating a treaty.137 The imprecision arises upon attempt-
ing to draw distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate uses of political and 
economic coercion. Certain political and economic pressures have a normal and 
legitimate role in international economic relations. 13" 
In contrast, the prohibition of the use of only physical force in treaty negotia-
tions would not disturb the treaty-making process. 139 The prohibition of physical 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
133. Note, The Effect of Duress, supra note 3, at 876. 
134. See supra note 90. 
135. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 94. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
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force would not have the same definitional problems that the prohibition of 
economic and political pressure would have. 14o The definition of prohibited acts 
of physical force is narrowed further by the Friendly Relations Declaration and 
the Definition of Aggression, which require 'that acts of prohibited force be 
"grievous and unambiguous," such as an actual invasion by one state's armed 
forces of another state's territory, including diplomatic premises. 141 Moreover, 
unlike political and economic pressures, acts of physical force have no legitimate 
role in international relations. 142 Therefore, when interpreting Article 52 in 
light of the concern of international jurists that treaties should not be invalidated 
for vague or imprecise reasons, the prohibitions of Article 52 must necessarily 
apply only to the use of physical force. As objectionable as economic and political 
coercion may be in concluding treaty negotiations, a state may not seek invalida-
tion of a treaty under Article 52 for such reasons. 
The conclusion that Article 52 prohibits only the threat or use of physical force 
in treaty negotiations is important to the evaluation of the Iranian hostage 
settlement. If Article 52 is interpreted to prohibit only acts of physical force, then 
the only inquiry concerning the validity of the Agreement is whether the occupa-
tion of the Embassy and the detention of the American hostages constitute acts 
of force in violation of Article 52. The next section specifically addresses this 
inquiry and evaluates the hostage settlement with respect to the prohibitions of 
Article 52. 
III. THE ACTS OF THE IRANIAN MILITANTS AS ACTS OF FORCE IN 
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 52 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the international community prohibits 
the threat or use of force in the conclusion of treaty negotiations. The prohibi-
tion is limited to the use of physical or armed force; economic and political 
coercion are not included within the prohibition. This section addresses the issue 
of whether the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the detention of fifty-two 
American citizens by the Iranian militants constituted a use of force within the 
general prohibition of Article 52, thereby vitiating America's consent to the 
agreement. 
A. Attributing the Acts of the Iranian Militants to the Iranian GOl'ernment 
The central inquiry in determining the applicability of Article 52 to the 
U.S.-Iran Agreement is whether the acts of the Iranian militants constitute a 
"threat or use of force" that is attributable to the Government of Iran. 143 The Ie] 
140. See id. 
141. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64. 
143. See infra text accompanying notes 144-160. 
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squarely addressed this issue in its final decision in the Case Concerning United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Stalf in Tehran. 144 The Court analyzed the hostage 
crisis by separating it into two phases. The first phase dealt specifically with the 
seizure of the embassy itself.1 45 The second phase concerned the continued 
occupation of the embassy by the Iranian militants.146 
With respect to the first phase, the IC] concluded that the militants' takeover 
of the embassy could not be imputed to the Iranian Government. 147 The Court 
stated that the militants acted independently; they were neither agents nor 
charged by a competent organ of the Iranian state. 148 This conclusion, however, 
does not necessarily absolve the Government of Iran of responsibility for the 
events that occurred during the first phase. 149 The Court determined that the 
failure of the Iranian Government to take appropriate steps to ensure the 
protection of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates as well as the diplomatic person-
nel or to persuade the militants to withdraw after the seizure occurred consti-
tuted a "clear and serious violation"150 of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 
1963,151 and the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular 
Rights. 152 The Court understood these international agreements to create obli-
gations in the Iranian Government to protect the embassy premises, the dip-
lomatic personnel, and other private citizens. 153 Iran's failure to satisfy their 
obligations under these agreements, which led to the takeover of the embassy, 
constituted a clear violation of its international obligations to the United 
States.154 Accordingly, although the Court would not impute the original 
144. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. 3 (May 24, 1980). 
145. Id. at 29. The Court described these events as: "the armed attack on the United States Embassy 
by militants on 4 November 1979, the overrunning of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as hostages, 
the appropriation of its property and archives and the conduct of the Iranian authorities in the face of 
those occurrences." I d. 
146. Id. at 33. According to the Court, this phase consisted of "the whole series of facts which 
occurred following the completion of the occupation of the United States Embassy by the militants, and 
the seizure of the Consulates of Tabriz and Shiraz." Id. 
147. Id. at 29. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 30. 
150. Id. at 32. 
151. Id. The Court interpreted the Vienna Convention of 1961, U.N. Doc. NConf. 20113 (1961), 
Apr. 18, 1961,23(3) U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502,500 U.N.T.S. 95, reprinted in 55 AM.]. INT'L L. 
1064 (Supp. 1961), to create obligations in the Iranian state to protect the Embassy premises, archives, 
and personnel and to afford the diplomatic staff freedom of movement and communication. leJ 
Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 30. The Vienna Convention of 1963, U.N. Doc. NConf. 25/12 (1963), Apr. 24, 
1963, 21( I) U .S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, reprinted in 57 AM.]. hdL L. 993 (Supp. 
1963), creates analogous obligations with respect to the consular premises, archives, and staff. See also 
Note, United States v. Iran, supra note 18, at 560, n.105. 
152. IeJ Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 32. The Court determined that the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations, and Consular Staffs, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8(1) U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 
284 U.N.T.S. 93, created further obligations in the Iranian state to afford private citizens of other states 
protection and security.ld. See also Note, United States v. Iran, supra note 18, at 560, n.105. 
153. See supra notes 151-152. 
154. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 32-33. 
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takeover of the embassy to the Iranian Government, the Court held Iran respon-
sible for Iran's failure to protect the embassy and diplomatic personnel. 
With respect to the second phase, the IC] determined that after the embassy 
and consulates had been seized and their staffs taken hostage, the Iranian 
Government had further obligations under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 
1963 and the 1955 Treaty of Amity to restore the premises to the United States 
and to offer to pay reparations. 155 Moreover, the IC] concluded that the an-
nounced policy of the Iranian Government to maintain the occupation of the 
embassy and the detention of the diplomatic staff transformed those acts into 
acts directly imputable to the Iranian State. 156 Although stating that the original 
takeover of the embassy was not imputable to the Iranian Government,157 the 
IC] concluded that the subsequent acts of the Iranian militants were attributable 
to the Iranian leaders.15s This conclusion was based not only on Iran's failure to 
protect the embassy and diplomatic staff but also on Iran's subsequent endorse-
ment of the occupation of the embassy and the continued detention of the 
hostages.1 59 The Court's statements are important, therefore, in that they not 
only impute the acts of the militants to the Iranian Government but also charac-
terize these acts as violations of Iran's international obligations. 16o These deter-
minations are relevant to an evaluation of the international validity of the 
hostage agreement. The validity of the Agreement turns on whether the acts of 
the Iranian Government, as characterized by the IC], constitute sufficient acts of 
force to invoke the prohibitions of Article 52. The next section analyzes the 
occupation of the embassy and the continued detention of the hostages in light 
of the definition of force in Article 52 to determine whether the prohibitions of 
Article 52 are applicable to the hostage settlement. 
B. The Application of Article 52 to the Acts of the Iranian GOllernment 
1. The Decision of the IC] 
The statements of the IC] in United States v. Iran are important to the determi-
nation of whether the Agreement violated Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. 161 
[d. 
155. [d. at 36-37. 
156. [d. at 35. The Court stated: 
The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the occupation of the 
Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure on 
the United States government was complied with by other Iranian authorities .... The result of 
that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the 
occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. 
The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian 
state, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy 
and detention of the hostages into acts of that state. 
157. [d. at 29. 
158. [d. at 35. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 36-37. 
161. lauterpacht, articulating the concern of many international jurists that the prohibition of 
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Although the IC] did not have the opportunity to review the provisions of the 
Agreement,l62 the Court's statements support the conclusion that the Agree-
ment was procured by the "threat or use of force" in violation of Article 52.163 
TwCl aspects of the Court's opinion are important to the evaluation of the 
international validity of the Agreement under Article 52. First, the IC] deter-
mined that the acts which gave rise to the Agreement and were imputable to the 
Iranian Government constitute violations of international law.16~ According to 
the Court, "[t]here is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of 
relations between States ... than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and 
embassies .... "165 Moreover, the IC] concluded that "[ w ]rongfully to deprive 
human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in 
conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the purposes of 
the Charter of the United Nations .... "166 Article 52 invalidates any treaty that 
has been procured by the threat or use of force "in violation of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."167 The conclusion of the IC] 
that the acts of the Iranian Government, in maintaining the occupation of the 
imposed treaties would allow states to denounce treaties too easily by making unfounded assertions of 
coercion, concluded that this difficulty would be overcome "by providing that a treaty was only to be 
invalid on the ground of coercion if so declared by the International Court of ]ustice." [I963] 2 V.B. 
INT'L L. COMM'N 51, U.N. Doc. NCN .4/156/1963; see Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151. Therefore, any 
treaty that is held illegal as procured by "force" by the ICJ would be invalid under Article 52. 
162. In its original application to the IC] in the Iraniafi hostage case, the United States argued that 
the embassy seizure violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 6. This 
allegation was deleted subsequently in the Memorial submitted by the United States to the World Court. 
!d. at 6-7. Consequently, the IC] did not determine whether the hostage-taking was proscribed by 
Article 2(4). Note, The Iranian Hostage Ag7tnnent, supra note 35, at 834-35. Moreover, because the 
decisIOn was handed down in May, 1980, several months before the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the United States and Iran, the IC] was unable to consider whether a ViolatIOn or ArtlCle !)Z 
occurred. Id. at 835. 
163. See infra text accompanying notes 164-171. 
164. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 35. 
165. Id. at 42. There is no question that by virtue of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
U.N. Doc. NConf.20/13, Apr. 16, 1961, signed April 18, 1961,23(3) U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 75021, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95, reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1064 (Supp. 1961), diplomatic personnel and premises 
are "entitled to unconditional immune treatment." Falk, supra note 13, at 404. Article 29 of the 
Convention provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any 
form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." 23(3) U.S.T. at 3240. 
Article 22 provides for the protection of the diplomatic premises: 
(I) The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not 
enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. 
(2) The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the 
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of 
the peace of the mission or im pairment of its dignity. 
(3) The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means 
of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or 
execution. 
23(3) U.S.T. at 3237-38. 
166. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 42. 
167. U.N. Doc. A.!Conf.39/27 at 25 (1969). 
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embassy and the detention of the diplomatic personnel, constitute violations of 
international law implies that those acts were in violation of Article 52. 
The second element of the ICJ's decision is extremely important to the deter-
mination that the Agreement was procured in violation of Article 52. The IC] 
concluded that the objective of the Iranian Government, in maintaining the 
occupation of the embassy and the detention of the American hostages, was to 
coerce the Unite States to make certain concessions.16s The purpose of Article 52 
is to prevent a state from using coercive measures in treaty negotiations to elicit 
unfavorable concessions from another state.169 According to the IC] ruling, the 
acts of the Iranian Government violated not only the prohibitions but also the 
purpose of Article 52.l1° Therefore, it would be difficult to deny that the 
Agreement "had been concluded under the threat of force and that that force 
was violative of international law."171 
2. The Right of Self-Defense 
Acts which give rise to the right of self~defense in accord with Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter172 were considered by certain delegates to the Vienna Convention 
to be clear violations of international law and, if exercised to procure the 
conclusion of a treaty, sufficient grounds to invalidate that treaty under Article 
52.173 Under customary international law, the use of force against another state's 
citizens or diplomatic territory constitutes sufficient provocation to justify the use 
of force in self-defense. 174 The occupation of the embassy and the detention of 
168. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 42. The Court stated: 
A marked escalation of these breaches can be seen to have occurred in the transition from the 
failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack by the militants on 4 
November 1979 and their seizure of the Embassy premises and staff, to the almost immediate 
endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created, and then to their maintaining 
deliberately for many months the occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff by a 
group of armed militants acting on behalf of the state for the purpose of forcing the United States to 
bow to certain demands. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
170. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 42. See also supra note 168. 
171. The Settlement With Iran, supra note 37, at 47 (statement of H. Smit). Professor Hans Smit noted: 
"We have an exercise of force that has been held by the highest tribunal to be a forbidden exercise of 
force. Thus, as international law stands today, it is impossible to contend that the use of force in this case 
is arguably permissible under international law." Id. at 52. 
172. See supra note 93. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. 
174. McLaughlin & Tec1aff, supra note 42, at 228. McLaughlin and Tec1aff argued that "[t]he 
coercion which might trigger a measure of self-defense should be powerfUl enough to qualify tor 
invalidation of an international agreement under [A]rtide 52." Id. 
One commentator argues that the measure of self-defense must be proportionate to the actual or 
imminent danger to the nationals in need of protection: 
In practice it cannot be said that a threat to the safety of nationals abroad constitutes a threat to 
the security of the state. Obviously, to imperil the safety of a single national abroad is not to 
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the hostages are sufficient acts of force to justify the use of force by the United 
States in self-defense, and should, therefore, constitute sufficient grounds to 
invalidate the Agreement under Article 52. 
3. Friendly Relations Declaration 
The acts of the Iranian Government also violate the Friendly Relations Decla-
ration,175 which is an authoritative interpretation of the definition of force as 
used in Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. 176 The Declaration prohibits, inter alia, 
the threat or use of force to violate the existing boundaries of another state in 
order to settle an international dispute. 177 Moreover, the Declaration specifically 
prohibits states from assisting or approving of civil strife or terrorism organized 
in its territory and directed at another state. 178 
For the purposes of the Friendly Relations Declaration, the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran constituted state territory.179 The seizure of the embassy by the Iranian 
militants violated the existing boundaries of that territory. Therefore, the 
takeover and occupation of the embassy violate Article I of the Declaration, 
which prohibits the violation of the boundaries of another state. 180 Moreover, 
the taking of diplomatic personnel as hostages constitutes a terrorist act. 181 Such 
acts translate into "a forceful reprisal against the United States and a resort to 
force to solve an international dispute."182 Therefore, according to the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, the acts of the Iranian Government constitute acts of 
physical force in the conclusion of a treaty which are sufficient to invoke the 
prohibitions of Article 52. 
imperil the security of the state; and yet there may be occasions when the threat of danger is 
great enough, or wide enough in its application to a sizable community abroad, for it to be 
legitimately construed as an attack on the state itself .... The measures of self-defence, of 
protection, must be proportionate to the danger, actual or imminent, to the nationals in need 
of protection. 
D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 93 (1958). 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 106-121. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121. 
177. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 106, at art. I. 
178. Note, Declaration of Friendly Relations, supra note 107, at 511. The Principle provides: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State, or acquiescing in organizing activities within 
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. 
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. N8018 (1970). 
179. International commentators have suggested that embassy grounds constitute state territory. See 
supra note 128. 
180. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 106, at art. I. The principle provides "that States shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity ... 
of any State .... " /d. 
181. See Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 833. 
182. Id. at 834. 
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4. Policy Reasons to Invalidate the Agreement under Article 52 
Strong policy reasons also exist for invalidating the Agreement under Article 
52.183 The purpose of Article 52 is to discourage the introduction of the threat or 
use of force in treaty negotiations. 184 Iran's act of holding fifty-two American 
ho~tages is the type of international incident most likely to be deterred by the 
enforcement of Article 52,185 especially since it is unlikely that Iran would have 
taken serious military measures to retaliate against the United States after invali-
dation of the Agreement. IS6 Moreover, by seeking to invalidate the Agreement, 
the United States would be providing the example to other nations that "seizing 
diplomatic personnel would be unwise, not only because it would generate 
negative world opinion, but also because any concessions are likely to be re-
pudiated."ls7 
The Iranian hostage settlement presents an ideal situation in which to invoke 
Article 52 to invalidate a tainted treaty. First, the acts of the Iranian Government 
have been judged by the highest international tribunal to constitute violations of 
international legal principles defined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Article 
52 of the Law of Treaties, and Article 52's subsequent interpretations. Second, 
the IC] further concluded that the effect of the actions by the Iranian Govern-
ment was to coerce the United States into making certain unfavorable conces-
sions, thereby violating the principles of Article 52. Third, the invalidation of the 
Agreement would most likely deter future internaional incidents of a similar 
nature. 
C. Arguments against Applying Article 52 to the Iranian Hostage Agreement 
Despite arguments in favor of invalidating the Agreement, a number of legal 
commentators have argued that the Iranian hostage settlement should not be 
invalidated under Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. ls8 One argument is that the 
framers of Article 52 did not consider "hostage-taking" to constitute an act of 
force prohibited by Article 52.189 Moreover, even if the acts of the Iranian 
183. See Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 834. 
184. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
185. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 834. 
186. Id. Members of the ILC, as well as other international commentators, were concerned that the 
power structure of the international community would seriously restrict the application of Article 52. 
See [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 247, U.N. Doc. NCN.41183 and Add.I-3/1966. It was believed that 
when the use of military force is invoked to procure the conclusion of a treaty, "[a]ny nation which has 
the power to impose such a treaty will also have the power to perpetuate its terms despite the fact that 
the treaty may be declared void." Malawer, Coerced Treatus, supra note 50, at 33. Accordingly, Article 52 
is best applied to coercive measures in which no threat of military force exists, such as with a 
hostage-taking, and when there is no threat that the aggressor nation will attempt to perpetuate the 
treaty by a continued use of force. See Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 834. 
187. Id. 
188. See Lowenfield, supra note 32, at 30; Rubin supra note 13, at 238-39 n.64; Malawer & Gordon, 
Iranian Hostage Agreement: A Debate, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 20, 1981, at 13, col. 1. 
189. Lowenfield, supra note 32, at 30. 
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Government constitute acts of force in violation of Article 52, the United States is 
estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement because it signed the 
settlement despite its awareness of Iran's ongoing use of force. 19o Finally, an-
other commentator has argued that the Agreement, which was aimed at return-
ing the parties to their original position before the crisis, could not be charac-
terized as "coerced."191 This subsection evaluates these arguments in light of the 
foregoing discussion of the definition of "force" as used in Article 52. 
L The Argument that "Hostage-Taking" Does Not Constitute an Act of 
Force under Article 52 
One legal commentator has asserted that the ILC did not intend Article 52 to 
encompass a government's taking of hostages. 192 This argument, however, is 
misleading. Although the ILC did not specifically refer to "hostage-taking" as a 
prohibited act under Article 52, neither did the ILC expressly exclude it. 193 The 
draftsmen of Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter, as well as those of Article 52, the 
Friendly Relations Declaration, and the Definition of Aggression, expressly 
avoided greater specificity for the reason that it would be "impossible to delimit 
in advance every possible case of force."194 Moreover, to the extent that a 
"hostage-taking" constitutes an act of terrorism, 195 it is characterized as an illegal 
use of force by the Friendly Relations Declaration,196 and thereby violates Article 
52. The decision of the IC] supports the conclusion that the hostage-taking by 
the Iranian Government violated Article 52 is supported by the holding of the 
IC]. The IC] concluded that Iran's purpose in continuing to hold the hostages 
was to coerce the U.S. Government into making certain concessions in negotiat-
ing an agreement for the hostages' release. 197 
2. The Argument that the United States' Knowledge of the Coercive Acts of 
the Iranian Government Precludes It from Challenging the Validity of the 
Agreement Under Article 52 
A second argument against applying Article 52 to the Agreement is that 
although Iran used coercive measures to conclude the Agreement, the United 
States knew of the ongoing use of force but nevertheless entered negotiations 
and signed the treaty. 198 Accordingly, the United States should be estopped 
190. Id. 
19!. Rubin, su.pra note 13, at 238-39 n.64. 
192. Lowenfie1d, supra note 32, at 30. 
193. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 83!. 
194. Id. at 831; see also supra note 123. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 181-182. 
196. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 834. 
197. IC] judgment, 1980 I.e.]. at 42. 
198. Lowenfield, supra note 32, at 30. 
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from renouncing the Agreement. 199 The argument, however, that a nation must 
be held to a coerced treaty merely "because it was cognizant of the coercion 
would render [A]rticle 52 meaningless."200 The purpose of Article 52 is to invaldi-
date treaties into which the victim state would not have entered but for the 
coercive measures taken by the aggressor state.201 If such measures are to have a 
coercive effect on a victim state, then that state must first be aware of the 
coercion.202 Moreover, it is questionable whether a state, subject to coercive 
pressures, enters freely into negotiations aimed at removing those pressures. 
Tht;refore, the knowledge that the United States had upon entering negotiations 
and signing the Agreement is irrelevant in determining whether to apply Article 
52. 
3. The Argument that the United States Was Not Prejudiced by the 
Agreement 
Another argument presented in support of upholding the Agreement is that 
the Agreement cannot be characterized as "coerced" because the United States 
was returned to the position it enjoyed prior to the crisis.203 In fact, one com-
mentator has doubted whether, in the absence of the political and economic 
crisis that arose from the hostage-taking, the United States could have obtained 
as "satisfactory an arrangement for the settlement of American claims as it was 
able to obtain through the hostage agreements."204 
The ILC, in its commentary on Article 52, implies that the status of a treaty, 
which was procured by the threat or use of force, would not be affected by terms 
199. Id. Under certain articles of the Vienna Convention, a country's acquiescence to certain infirm 
treaties does prevent it from nullifying a treaty under the terms of the Law of Treaties. For instance, 
under Article 45, a state is estopped from invalidating a treaty if it expressly agrees to the validity of the 
treaty after becoming aware of facts that taint the treaty. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 
35, at 836. Article 45 specifically provides that it applies only to "invalidating, terminating, withdrawing 
from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 or 62." U.N. Doc. 
NConf.39127, at 22-23 (1969). Its silence with regard to Article 52 is significant. 
200. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 836. 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
202. Id. A logical extension of this argument is to say that if the victim state ratifies a coerced treaty 
after the coercive influences are removed, a second agreement will have been concluded between the 
parties. This analysis is discussed infra in § IV(B). 
203. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 13, at 238-39 n.64. Rubin argues: 
Id. 
[I)t is hardly logical to classify an agreement aimed at returning the situation to what it was 
before the delict occurred as "coerced" or "procured" by the delict itself .... Moreover, even if 
the agreement is void, the legal result of such a holding would be to end the parts of it that 
created obligations in the Bank of England to hold some of the money pending actions of the 
tribunal set up by the Agreement to hear and evaluate the various claims. The money would 
probably have to be returned immediately to Iran, its undisputed source, and not [to) the 
United States banks, which had no claim at all to the money other than as places in which Iran 
had at one time in the distant past deposited it under normal banking arrangements. It is hard 
to see how such a step could help anybody in the United States. 
204. Gordon, supra note 188, at 14, col. 1. 
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in the treaty favorable to the victim state.205 The ILC concludes that a victim state 
cannot be returned to its original position unless the coercive treaty is actually 
nulIified.206 Therefore, although the hostage settlement contained terms favor-
able to the United States, it would still be invalid under Article 52. 
Even if favorable terms in a coerced treaty are sufficient to validate it under 
international law , it is questionable whether the terms of the hostage agreement 
are in fact favorable to the United States. Although the Agreement effectuated 
the objective sought by the Carter Administration throughout the crisis, i.e. the 
release of the hostages, the price for that release was high.207 The United States 
was forced to concede claims of American nationals against the Government of 
Iran.208 American litigants, especially those who had received prejudgment 
attachments in U.S. courts,209 were therefore prejudiced by the Agreement. 210 
The American plaintiffs, with suits already pending in U.S. courts, lost not only 
their lawsuits but also the opportunity to satisfy potential judgments.211 In 
return, the litigants were given the opportunity to bring their claims to a remote 
tribunal, with uncertain effectiveness and limited security.212 Furthermore, the 
argument that the Agreement was "aimed at returning the situation to what it 
was before the delict occurred"213 is also weakened by the conclusion of the IC] 
that Iran acted to "forc[e] the United States to bow to certain demands."214 
D. Conclusion 
The decision of the IC] in United States v. Iran supports the position that the 
Agreement is invalid under international law . The IC] concluded that the acts of 
the Iranian militants were imputable to the Iranian Government, that the acts 
violated international law, and that the acts coerced the United States into 
making concessions in the Iranian hostage settlement.215 These findings, 
coupled with the principle that the act of hostage-taking constitutes an act of 
sufficient force to give rise to the right of self-defense,216 support the conclusion 
205. Su [1966] 2 V.B. 1NT'L L. COMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41183 and Add.1-3. See also 
Turner, TM U.S.-Iran Accords, supra note 71, at 349. For a further discussion of the validity of a coerced 
treaty which is favorable to the victim state, see infra text accompanying notes 242-250. 
206.Id. 
207. Howard, Implications oftM Iranian Assets Casefor American Business, 16 INT'L LAw. 128, 130-132 
(1982). Howard analyzes the disastrous effect that the Agreement had on American business. He 
concludes that although the Agreement constituted a "diplomatic triumph," it "demeans that accom-
plishment to pretend that no price was paid to secure the return of our hostages." Id. 
208. See Declaration, supra note 26, at paras. 10-17. 
209. Su supra text accompanying notes 9-12. 
210. Howard, supra note 207, at 130-132. 
211. Id. at 131. 
212. Id. 
213. Rubin, supra note 13, at 238-239 n.64. 
214. IC] Judgment, 1980 I.C.]. at 42. 
215. Su supra text accompanying notes 144-171. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174. 
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that the Agreement violates Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. The acts of 
occupying the U.S. Embassy and holding the diplomatic personnel hostage also 
violate the Friendly Relations Declaration,217 which is an authoritative interpre-
tation of the definition of force as used in Article 52.218 Moreover, there are 
policy reasons in support of the conclusion that the Agreement violates Article 
52. Invalidating the Agreement on the basis that an attack on a nation's diplomat-
ic premises and the detention of its personnel constitute internationally illegal 
acts is likely to deter similar conduct in the future. 219 
A number of arguments have been raised against the invalidation of the 
Agreement under Article 52.220 One argument is that terrorist acts, such as those 
of the Iranian Government, were not contemplated by the framers of Article 52 to 
violate the prohibitions of that article.221 The framers, however, avoided the 
specificity that would be necessary to detail every possible use of prohibited 
force. A second argument is that the United States, fully aware of the coercive 
measures applied by Iran, entered freely into the negotiations and should 
therefore be estopped from asserting the invalidity of the Agreement. 222 This 
argument, however, is inconsistent with the purpose of Article 52, which is to 
relieve a victim state from its obligations under a coerced treaty. Such protection 
must necessarily apply to states which are subject to coercive measures and which 
enter negotiations with the aggressor state to remove those pressures. A final 
argument is that the Agreement cannot be characterized as "coerced" because it 
was aimed at restoring the positions of the parties prior to the crisis. 223 This 
conclusion, however, ignores the fact that the Agreement caused various Amer-
ican litigants to lose not only their claims against the Government of Iran but also 
their ability to satisfy potential judgments. Accordingly, the Agreement did not 
restore the United States to the position it enjoyed prior to the crisis. Moreover, 
even if the Agreement served the purpose of restoring the United States to its 
original position, the ILC has implied that such restoration would not change the 
original invalidity of the Agreement under Article 52.224 
Having established that the Agreement is void under Article 52, this Comment 
next determines the legal effect of such an invalidation. According to the provi-
sions of the Law of Treaties, a treaty invalidated under Article 52 would be 
considered "void," thereby relieving parties from any obligations that arose from 
it. 225 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 175-182. 
218. Rosenstock, supra note 85, at 714; see also Malawer, Coerced Treaties, supra note 50, at 33. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 183-187. 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 188-214. 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 192-197. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 203-214. 
224. See supra text accompanying note 205. 
225. See inlra text accompanying notes 233-250. 
1984] DURESS IN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 165 
IV. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF INVALIDATING A TREATY UNDER ARTICLE 52 
This section discusses the procedure and legal effect of invalidating a treaty 
under Article 52. Generally, a state may not unilaterally renounce a treaty.226 
Instead, an international tribunal must make this determination.227 If that inter-
national tribunal rules that the treaty was concluded in violation of Article 52, 
the treaty is void.228 This section also discusses whether a victim state may 
nevertheless voluntarily assume the obligations under the coerced treaty. 
A. Procedure for Invalidating a Treaty under Article 52 
In the first draft of Article 52, Sir Lauterpacht indicated that "no party to a 
treaty ... [may unilaterally] declare it invalid on the ground that it has been 
concluded under duress."229 This approach reflects the concern of ILC members 
that to allow the interested state to declare unilaterally a treaty invalid would 
seriously undermine the stability of treaty negotiations.23o Consequently, in 
order to invalidate a treaty under Article 52, a state must allege to an interna-
tional tribunal that the treaty was procured by duress, and the tribunal must 
make a finding to that effect.231 Lauterpacht concluded that the IC] would be 
the proper tribunal to review such allegations.232 
B. The Legal Effect of an Invalidated Treaty 
Once a state has brought an allegedly infirm treaty to the attention of the IC] 
and that body recognizes the infirmity, the treaty is void under the terms of 
226. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151. 
227. Id. 
228. [1966) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. AlCN.41183 and Add.I-311966. 
229. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 152. 
230. Id. at 151. Lauterpacht noted: 
Id. 
There is no warrant for assuming that by giving to the various aspects of invalidity a place in 
the Code of the Law of Treaties, encouragement may be given to arbitrary appeal to them. If 
the safeguards of a judicial nature formulated in the present article are adopted, they will rule 
as a matter of law, any abusive or unilateral reliance on the fact or assertion of coercion. It will 
not be the interested state but International Court of Justice which will declare the treaty to be 
invalid. 
231. Id. at 150-51; see also A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 210 (1961). Under other articles of the 
Law of Treaties, a treaty may be declared invalid by the Security Council if brought for conciliation 
procedures. U.N. Doc. AlConf.39127, art. 66 (1969). 
232. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 151. Lauterpacht noted: 
Id. 
If a State has been unlawfully coerced into entering a treaty, the proper course for it is- when 
conditions permit - to ask an international tribunal to make, in contentious proceedings, a 
declaration to that effect .... In view of the gravity of the issues involved the International 
Court of Justice would seem to be the proper tribunal competent to declare the invalidity of the 
treaty. 
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Article 52.233 Considerable controversy existed among the members of the ILC, 
however, concerning the legal status of a treaty which is invalid under Article 52. 
The controversy revolved around whether the invalidated treaty should be void 
or voidable at the request of the victim state.234 
There is a distinction between the terms void and voidable. If a treaty is 
declared void, as opposed to voidable, it is without legal efficacy and cannot be 
cured by subsequent ratification or affirmance by the victimized state.235 The 
framers of Article 52 felt that this distinction was important because if a treaty 
were merely voidable, a more powerful state could not only coerce a state into 
entering the treaty but also, by using threats of continuing force, convince the 
victimized state to ratify subsequently the tainted pact. 236 
In the original draft of the Law of Treaties,237 Special Rapporteur Waldock 
argued that states which had been coerced into signing a treaty had the option of 
declaring "that the coercion nullified its consent to be bound by the treaty ab 
initio,"238 or of affirming the treaty "provided always that no such aflirmation 
shall be considered binding unless made after the coercion has ceased."239 
Accordingly, the injured state, after assessing its position under the treaty, could 
seek to void the treaty or to ratify its terms.240 Waldock's approach essentially 
made a coerced treaty voidable at the option of the injured state.241 
The ILC specifically rejected Waldock's conclusion and determined that 
coerced treaties were void, rather than voidable at the option of the injured 
state. 242 The rationale of this rule is that the parties to a coerced treaty can only 
233. U.N. Doc. NConf.39/27 (1969). Article 52 provides: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been 
procured by the threat or use of force .... " Id. 
234. See infra text accompanying notes 237-244. 
235. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 914 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952); see also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1411 (5th ed. 1979). 
236. See infra note 244. 
237. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 
reprinted in U.N. Conf. on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, NConf.39/111Add.2 at 66-67 (1971). 
238. Quoted in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES: TRAVAUX PREPARATORIES 361 (D. 
Rauschning ed. 1978). 
239. Id. See also Turner, The U.S.-Iran Accords, supra note 71, at 349. 
240. [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 229, 233, U.N. Doc. NCN.4I15611963. Waldock advocated this 
position to avoid the practical difficulties of voiding a treaty ab initio: 
Id. 
A much stronger reason [for declaring the treaty to be voidable] ... was that it was not always 
possible to undo altogether situations created under a treaty. Some treaties were contractual in 
nature, others were legislative. Many treaties had consequences in internal law. Hence it was 
not easy simply to declare that a treaty was void ab initio. Moreover, even if it were possible to 
undo everything that had been done by virtue of the treaty, that might not be the most 
satisfactory solution for the injured party. 
241. Turner, The U.S.-Iran Accords, supra note 71, at 349. 
242. The ILC concluded that coerced treaties are void ab initio under Article 49[52]: "Even if it were 
conceivable that after being liberated from the influence of a threat or of a use of force a State may wish 
to allow a treaty procured from it by such means, the Commission considered it essential that the treaty 
should be regarded in law as void ab initio." [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. 
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be returned to full legal equality by the invalidation of the treaty.243 If the treaty 
were merely considered voidable, the state which had the power to impose the 
treaty would also have the power to perpetuate its terms.244 
Although the ILC deliberately used "void" rather than "voidable" to charac-
terize the legal status of a coerced treaty, the procedures the Commission 
established to resolve such disputes do not distinguish between void and voidable 
treaties.245 In order to invoke Article 52 to invalidate a treaty, an injured state 
must request the IC] to pronounce the illegality of the treaty.246 Such a request 
presupposes that the injured state is willing to allege the invalidity of the treaty 
before the ICJ.247 Nothing in Article 52 compels a state to treat as void a treaty 
AlCN.4I183 and Add.I-311966. Professor Robert Ago of Italy, who served as both the President of the 
ILC and the President of the Vienna Convention, argued that "[i]n the case contemplated in [Article 
52], the nullity was absolute, and the treaty should be incapable of being retrieved even by some action 
by the interested party." [1966]1(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 34, U.N. Doc. AlCN.4I183 and Add.I-311966 
(Statement of Mr. Ago, Italy). 
One commentator noted that the ILC made coerced treaties void ab initio because of the "abhorrent" 
nature of such treaties: "Apparently the International Law Commission believed that coerced treaties 
were so abhorrent, and so threatening to all beginning nations, that States should not even have the 
option of abiding by them." Note, The Iranum Hostage Ag7eement, supra note 35, at 836. Another 
commentator argued that "[t]he majority [of the ILC] ... considered that the threat or use of force to 
extort the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty must be considered a matter of such depravity as to 
fail for complete voidness and not mere voidability." T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAw OF TREATIES 171 
(1974). 
243. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. AlCN.4I183 and Add.I-311966. 
244. The ILC assumed that even after a treaty was concluded, the coercive influences would 
continue. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 
reprinud in U.N. Conference in the Law of Treaties, Official Records, AlConf.391II1Add.2 at 66-67. 
One legal commentator noted: "[A]rticJe 52 was explicitly drafted to ensure that the victim state 
would not have the option to validate the void treaty. The assumption was that there would be a 
continuing effect of the threat or use of force." The Settlement with Iran, supra note 37, at 60 (Statement 
of O. Schacter). 
245. Note, The Iranian Hostage Crisis, supra note 35, at 837. 
246. Id. The result was fully discussed in Gordon & Malawer, The Iranian Hostage Ag7eements: A 
Debate, Nat'l L. j., Apr. 20, 1981, at 3, col. I. Professor Gordon argued that the inevitable consequence 
of Article 52 as adopted by the ILC is that "no matter how beneficial an agreement may be to a state, it is 
unconditionally void if it has been procured under proscribed conditions of coercion." /d. at 14. 
Compulsory invalidation of a "coerced" treaty would prevent a state against which proscribed force is 
being used to effect the removal of that force by agreement. Accordingly, Gordon argues that Article 52 
should be modified because neither its purpose nor state practice indicates that the article should be 
applied to every international agreement that grows out of situations that would apparently fall within 
its ambit. /d. 
Malawer answers this argument by clarifying that although a treaty may not be imposed by an 
aggressor on a victim of that aggression, the victim may impose that agreement on the aggressor. Id. at 15. 
This is true because a treaty will not be characterized as "coerced" if it is more favorable to the victim 
and the victim wishes to impose it upon the aggressor. Id. Therefore, a treaty does not fall within the 
prohibitions of Article 52 when imposed upon the aggressor. Id. at 15. 
247. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 150. Lauterpacht noted: "[I]t must, de kge ferenda, be regarded as 
fundamerltal that any allegation of the invalidity of a treaty ... may properly be made with legal effect 
only ... if accompanied by a willingness of the State making such allegations to obtain a finding of an 
international tribunal in the matter .... " Id. 
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procured by the threat or use of force.248 Accordingly, a vICtIm state may 
maintain the terms of a coerced treaty merely by refusing to challenge the 
validity of the treaty under Article 52. 
The ILC recognized that a victim state may wish to enforce the terms of an 
infirm treaty. In its commentary on Article 52, the Commission concluded that 
although a victim state could never recognize the validity of a treaty which was 
procured by the threat of force, it may conclude a new treaty with the aggressor 
state after the coercive influences are removed.249 Thus, as long as the parties to 
the treaty are at full legal equahty, the subject matter of the coerced treaty could 
be revived.250 
C. Conclusion 
An injured state may challenge the validity of a coerced treaty only before the 
IC]. 251 Ifthe IC] holds that the conclusion of the treaty did in fact violate Article 
52, the treaty would be void.252 If, however, the coerced state is unwilling to 
petition the IC] to review the validity of the treaty, the effect of such inaction is 
that a new, "non-coerced" treaty would be concluded between the parties.253 
The inconsistency between the procedures and legal effect of invalidating a 
treaty under Article 52 is relevant to the Iranian hostage settlement. President 
Reagan, instead of petitioning the IC] to review the Agreement, ratified it after 
the hostages were returned. 254 The ILC, recognizing that a victim state may wish 
to assume voluntarily the obligations of the tainted treaty,255 provided that the 
treaty may be cured by subsequent ratification.256 Accordingly, the ratification by 
the United States of the Agreement may constitute the conclusion ofa new treaty 
between the United States and Iran, free from the defects arising from the 
hostage-taking. If a new agreement is considered to have been entered between 
248. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 837. 
249. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. AlCN.41183 and Add.I-311966. The ILC 
commented: 
The Commission considered it essential that the treaty should be regarded as void ah initio. 
This would enable the State concerned to take its decision in regard to the maintenance of the 
treaty in a position of full legal equality with the other State. If, therefore, the treaty were 
maintained in force, it would in eflect he by the concluswn of a new treaty and not by the recognition 
of the validity of a treaty procured by means contrary to the most fundamental principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
Id. at 247 (emphasis added). 
250. Id. See also T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 171 (1974). 
25 I. Lauterpacht, supra note 55, at 15 I. 
252. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. AlCN.41183 and Add.I-3/1966. 
253. Id. 
254. Exec. Order 12,294,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 139 (1982), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). Reagan issued the executive order ratifying the hostage agreement on February 24, 198 Lid. The 
hostages were returned to the United States on January 20,1981. N.Y. Times,Jan. 21,1981, ad, col. 1. 
255. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. AlCN.41183 and Add.I-311966. 
256. Id. 
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the United States and Iran, then American litigants, whose suits against the 
Government of Iran are barred by the Agreement,257 would be unable to pursue 
their claims against Iran by challenging the Agreement's validity.258 The next 
section discusses whether in fact President Reagan's ratification constituted the 
conclusion of a new agreement. 
V. RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
A. President Reagan's Ratification 
On February 24, 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order259 which 
ratified the Agreement negotiated and concluded by his predecessor, President 
Carter. 260 In a statement issued six days before the executive order,261 the 
Reagan Administration addressed the constitutionality of the Agreement under 
domestic law, 262 but declined to evaluate its international validity. 263 
257. Declaration, supra note 26, at paras. 10-16. 
258. See intra text accompanying notes 275-287. 
259. Exec. Order 12,294, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 139 (1982),50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). For a discussion of the terms of this order, see supra text accompanying notes 37-44. 
260. The Agreement was concluded on January 19, 1981, see supra text accompanying note 24, the 
day before Reagan was inaugurated. President Carter summarized the actions of his Administration 
with respect to the conclusion of the hostage crisis in a statement to Congress on January 19, 1981. 
President Carter's Summary Statement to the Congress Uanuary 19, 1981) reprinted in The Settlement with 
Iran, supra note 37, at A-56. 
261. Reagan Administration Statement Regarding the Settlement with Iran, Feb. 18, 1981, 2048 
DEPT. STATE BULL. 17 (1981). 
262. [d. The statement reads: "The conclusion of the' agreements was a legal exercise of Presidential 
authority. This authority will be subject to challenge in our courts, and the executive branch will, of 
course, abide by the determination of our judicial system." [d. The major challenges to the constitution-
ality of the Agreement have been, first, that the President did not have the authority to conclude the 
Agreement and to suspend the claims of American nationals brought in U.S. courts against the Iranian 
Government; and, second, that the suspension of a claim against the Iranian Government constituted a 
taking of private property without just compensation as required by the fifth amendment. The 
constitutionality of the Agreement was upheld by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981). 
263. 2048 DEPT. STATE BULL. 17 (1981). The statements reads: "We did not find it necessary to reach a 
conclusion as to the legally binding character of these agreements under international law." [d. Al-
though the discussion of the constitutionality of the Agreement is beyond the scope of this Comment, it 
is important to note the relationship between domestic and international law on this issue. Clearly, it is 
possible that a treaty may be valid internationally and yet violate the domestic law of one of the parties. 
Under Article 27 of the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. NConf. 39/27 (1969), such a treaty would subsist as 
an international obligation, unless the constitutional violation is "manifest", that is, "easily and objec-
tively evident to other states, and concerned with a rule of internal law of fundamental importance .... " 
McLaughlin & Teclaff, supra note 42, at 226. See also A. McNAIR, supra note 231, at 164. In the instant 
case, Iran was entitled to accept the President's claim to possess sufficient power to conclude the 
Agreement. Jd. at 229; see also Article 7, para. 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
U.N. Doc. NConf.39/27 (1969) (assumes the competence of heads of state to conclude international 
agreements). Therefore, unless the ICJ concluded that the Agreement is void under the Law of 
Treaties, thereby negating the Agreement's force under international law , the obligations of the United 
States will remain in force even if the Agreement is held unconstitutional under domestic law. 
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The inequalities which existed during the negotiation process due to Iran's 
continued occupation of the embassy and detention of the hostages had been 
removed by the time President Reagan made his decision to maintain the 
Agreement. 264 The commentary of the Law of Treaties contemplates that a 
coerced state may determine, after all the coercive influences are nullified, to 
maintain in force the original agreement, thereby concluding a new treaty.265 If 
this rationale is applied to the instant case, the ratification by the Reagan Admin-
istration of the Agreement must be characterized as the formation of a new 
agreement between the United States and Iran. Although President Reagan 
declined to evaluate the international validity of the Agreement, the effect of his 
executive order was to enforce the earlier agreement concluded between the 
United States and Iran. It is difficult to distinguish this ratification from the type 
of affirmance considered by the ILC266 to constitute the formation of a new 
treaty. 
Recognition that the new agreement was established between the United States 
and Iran would validate the terms of the prior settlement, including those terms 
which extinguished all claims brought by American nationals against the Gov-
ernment of Iran. 267 These claimants may argue that the Reagan Administration's 
failure to evaluate the international validity of the Agreement under international 
law constitutes a loophole which preserves their claims. 26B In order to challenge 
successfully the original Agreement, the claimants must argue that President 
Reagan's denial to evaluate the Agreement should be construed to preserve any 
action that the United States may subsequently pursue before the IC].269 In this 
vein, the claimants could argue that to allow the establishment of a new agree-
ment in circumstances such as the instant case "would defeat [AJrticie 52 
whenever the victimized nation did not object; the country could always be said 
to have entered into a new agreement once hostilities were ended."270 Such 
arguments, however, do not take into account that the purpose of President 
Reagan's executive order was to enforce the Agreement. 271 It would be con-
tradictory for the claimants to argue that the Reagan Administration order both 
validated the Agreement and preserved the right of the United States to chal-
lenge the Agreement before the IC]. 
In conclusion, President Reagan's ratification of the Agreement constitutes the 
establishment of a new, internationally valid agreement between the United 
264. Gordon, supra note 188, at 14, col. I. 
265. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 246, 247, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/183 and Add. 1-311966. 
266. See supra note 249. 
267. See supra text accompanying notes 255-258. 
268. Malawer & Gordon, The Iranian Hostage Agreements, supra note 32, at 15, col. I. 
269. Id. 
270. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 836. 
271. Exec. Order No. 12,294,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 139 (1982), 50 U.S.c. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981); Reagan Administration Statement Regarding the Settlement with Iran (Feb. 18, 1981), 2048 
DEPT. STATE BULL. 17 (1981). 
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States and Iran. Therefore, the terms of the original agreement remain in force, 
thereby precluding U.S. nationals from bringing suit against the Government of 
Iran. The Agreement will frustrate the satisfaction of claims against the Gov-
ernment of Iran unless the Arbitral Tribunal272 accepts jurisdiction over those 
claims.273 
B. Potential Claims under the Agreement 
This section discusses the current status of the litigants who may have potential 
claims against the Government of Iran. First, the author explains how the 
different categories of claimants are treated under the Agreement. Second, the 
author discusses whether the claimants may seek compensation from the United 
States Government under the fifth amendment's Just Compensation Clause. 274 
I. Different Categories of Claimants 
Generally, three categories of claimants exist under the Agreement: former 
hostages,275 banks with loans outstanding to Iranian borrowers,276 and any Amer-
ican national who has a commercial claim arising out of a binding contract with 
the Iranian Government.277 The Agreement treats these groups of claimants 
differently.278 The Agreement fully extinguishes any claim that a former hostage 
may bring arising out of the seizure of the embassy or his subsequent deten-
tion. 279 Accordingly, if the validity of the Agreement is left unchallenged under 
international law, the hostages would be precluded from bringing suit against 
272. The Arbitral Tribunal was established by the Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 29. See 
also supra note 40. 
273. The Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction over only commercial claims arising between the United 
States and Iran and their nationals. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II, paras. I, 2. 
The settlement expressly excludes all other claims arising out of the hostage crisis. [d. 
274. Ste supra note 49. 
275. Declaration, supra note 26, at para. II. 
276. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II, para. I. 
277. [d. 
278. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 859. 
279. Declaration, supra note 26, at para. II. The Declaration provides: "[T]he United States will 
... bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claims of ... United States 
nationals arising out of events ... related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on 
November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention .... " [d. 
One claim that a former hostage might raise is a tort claim for false imprisonment. The tort of false 
imprisonment protects the "personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement." W. PROSSER, 
THE LAw OF TORTS, 42 (4th ed. 1971). In order to establish aprimafacie case of false imprisonment, a 
plaintiff must show that there was a "nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without 
lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short." City of Newport Beach v. Sasse, 9 
Cal. App. 3d 803, 810, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (1970). The plaintiff is entitled to compensation "for his 
loss of time, for physical discomfort or inconvenience, and for any resulting physical illness or injury to 
his health. Since the injury is in large part a mental one, he is entitled to damages for his mental 
suffering, humiliation, and the like." W. PROSSER, supra, at 43 (footnotes omitted). 
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Iran and instead must look to the United States for compensation for their 
detention.280 
Unlike the former hostages, litigants with commercial claims against the Gov-
ernment of Iran are not precluded by the Agreement from receiving compensa-
tion from Iran. 281 Banks which had loaned money to Iranian borrowers were 
allowed to offset fully the debts with the Iranian assets that were on deposit in 
those banks at the time of the Agreement. 282 Litigants with contract claims 
against Iran fall within an intermediate category whereby partial compensation 
is available.283 Claimants with binding contracts with Iran that do not include a 
choice-of~forum clause284 are required to submit their claims to an international 
tribunal for arbitration.285 Iran, in turn, agreed to post a portion of its freed 
assets as security for the satisfaction of these commercial claims in the Arbitral 
Tribunal.286 Such claims are ineffective in U.S. courts unless the Arbitral Tri-
bunal refuses jurisdiction.287 
280. President Carter issued an executive order, Exec. Order No. 12,285,3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 
117 (1982). 50 U.S.c. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). which created the Commission on Hostage 
Compensation for the purpose ot adVISIng the President as to the United States' obligation to compen-
sate the hostages for injuries resulting from their captivity. The Commission found: (I) eachgovemment 
employee held by the Iranian militants should be compensated $12.50 per day of captivity; (2) the United 
States is not legally obligated to compensate the hostages for the loss of their right to sue Iran; (3) the 
United States is not liable for physical harm or mental distress suffered by the hostages during their 
detention; and (4) the United States owed no compensation to the sole hostage who was not a 
government employee. See Note. Hostage Compensation: United States Liability for Injuries Suffered by 
Nationals Held in Iran, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1982). 
281. Claims Settlement Agreement. supra note 29, at art. II, paras. 1, 2. 
282. Id. See also Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 859. 877. 
283. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 859. 
284. According to the Agreement, a choice-of-forum clause is one which specifically provides that 
any disputes concerning the contract "shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian 
courts." Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II, para. 1. The effect of the clause would 
be to limit subsequent adjudication to Iranian courts. The Supreme Court has recognized that choice-
of-forum clauses, otherwise valid, will not be enforced if its enforcement would effectively deprive the 
plaintiff of his day in court. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1.9, 18-19 (1972). Certainly, 
the changed circumstances in I ran since the contracts were entered into could constitute grounds for 
invalidating the choice-of-forum clauses on the basis that "the courts of the chosen state ... would deal 
unfairly with the plaintiff and deny him relief to which he is entitled." Reese, A Pr<>jJosed Uniform Choice 
of Forum Act. 5 CoLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193,202 (1966). If the choice-of-forum clauses are invalidated. 
these claimants would have the same status as the other contract claimants and would presumably be 
allowed to assert their claim before the Tribunal. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement. supra note 35, at 
875 n.356. 
285. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II, para. I. 
286. Declaration, supra note 26. at paras. 1, 6-7. According to the Agreement. Iran is required to 
establish a one-billion dollar escrow account for the satisfaction of claims settled by the Tribunal. In 
addition. Iran is required to replenish the fund whenever it dips below $500 million. Id. There is no 
guarantee, however, that Iran will replenish the fund as required. McLaughlin & Teclaff. supra note 42. 
at 250. Accordingly, although the contract claimants may assert their claims to the Arbitral Tribunal, 
their ability to satisfy any judgment is sharply reduced by the limited security available. 
287. See Exec. Order No. 12.294, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp .• p. 139 (1982). 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981). 
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2. The Theory of Recover v: Just Compensation Under the Fifth Amendment 
The Agreement frustrates former hostages and contract claimants from re-
ceiving full compensation for their claims against the Government of Iran. The 
claimants, however, may alternatively seek compensation from the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The fifth amendment of the Constitution provides that the govern-
ment cannot take private property for a public purpose without fully compensat-
ing the owner of that property.2MB To the extent that the Agreement constituted 
the taking of valid claims of American nationals for the "public purpose" of 
terminating the hostage crisis, the U.S. Government may be required to pay just 
compensation to the frustrated claimants. 289 
The purpose of the fifth amendment's Just Compensation Clause is "to bar 
[the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."290 Accord-
ingly, controversies concerning just compensation arise when an individual is 
deprived of a property interest as a result of the legitimate exercise of gov-
ernmental authority.291 In such a controversy, the government must provide 
compensation which is a "full and perfect equivalent" for what is lost. 292 
The president has well-established powers to conduct foreign affairs,293 which 
include the power to enter into international claims settlement agreements. 294 
The exercise of this power, however, is neither unlimited nor exempt from other 
constitutional limitations, particularly those of the fifth amendment.295 There-
fore, when the president legitimately exercises his constitutional powers296 in 
288. For the text of the Just Compensation Clause, see supra note 49. 
289. An underlying assumption of this subsection is that the Agreement between the United States 
and Iran will remain in force and that the claimants - former hostages and contract litigants - will 
never have their day in court against the Government of Iran. That is, the former hostages and contract 
claimants will not have their claims against Iran satisfied because the Agreement extinguishes the 
hostages' claims and, with respect to the contract claimants. the Arbitral Tribunal can draw only from 
the limited security provided by Iran. See supra text accompanying notes 278-287. 
290. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
291. Note, Dames & Moore, supra note II, at 345. 
292. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); see also Note, The Iranian 
Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 876. 
293. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (broad delegation of 
congressional authority to the President is not unconstitutional in the area of foreign affairs). 
294. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 
(1937). 
295. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957). In Reid, the Supreme Court held that American civilian 
dependents of overseas personnel were entitled to a civilian trial. The Reid Court concluded that "no 
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on Congress, or any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraint of the Constitution." Id. at 16. 
296. The Supreme Court concluded in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), that the 
President had the constitutional authority to suspend claims of American nationals against Iran. 453 
U.S. at 675-88. The government cannot defend a suit brought in the Court of Claims under the just 
compensation clause, however, on the basis that the exercise of presidential power in suspending the 
claims was constitutional. The majority opinion in Dames & Moore recognized as much: "Though we 
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such a way to take private property to achieve a public purpose, the fifth 
amendment requires that the owner of that property be justly compensated. 297 
Traditionally, the settlement by the federal government of claims of its nation-
als against foreign states has not been considered a compensable taking within 
the meaning of the fifth amendment.298 The Supreme Court's treatment of the 
compensation issue in Dames & Moore v. Regan, however, casts doubt as to 
whether the traditional rule will be applied in the present case. Although the 
Regan Court felt that the compensation issue was not ripe for review,299 the 
Court added that there were no jurisdictional grounds to bar such action in the 
Court of Claims.30o Moreover, Justice Powell, concurring with the majority, 
argued that those nationals who had their claims against Iran suspended were 
entitled to compensation under the fifth amendment. 301 He stated: 
The Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the 
Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargaining chips" claims 
lawfully held by relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction 
of our courts. The extraordinary powers of the President and Con-
gress upon which our decision rests cannot, in the circumstances of 
this case, displace the Just Compensation Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 302 
In order to establish a compensable taking in the present case, the petitioners 
must satisfy two requirements. First, the claimants must show that they had a 
significant property interest prior to the conclusion of the Agreement.303 The 
central inquiry here is whether a claim brought against the Iranian Government 
constitutes a "significant property interest."304 Second, if it is established that the 
claimants could have successfully litigated their claims but for the Agreement, the 
inquiry becomes whether the deprivation of this right meets the constitutional 
standards established by the fifth amendment.305 
conclude that the President has settled petitioner'S claim against Iran, we do not suggest that the 
settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim against the United States." Dames f.5 Moore, 
453 U.S. at 688-89 n.14. 
297. S •• L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 459 (1978). 
298. See, e.g., Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941). See also Note, supra note 
280, at 136; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNSTITUTION 262 (1972). Henkm summanzed the 
view adopted by U.S. courts: 
No one has successfully argued in the Supreme Court that in purporting to dispose of private 
claims ... the United States deprived the original claimants of property without due process of 
law, impaired the obligations of their contracts, or appropriated their claims for a public 
purpose and was obligated to pay them just compensation for any loss. 
ld. at 263 (footnotes omitted). 
299. Dames f.5 Moure, 453 U.S. at 688-89. 
300. ld. at 689-90. 
301. ld. at 691 (Powell, j., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
302. ld. (footnote omitted). 
303. Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement, supra note 35, at 860. 
304. /d. 
305. Id. 
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The contract claimants have two separate arguments for compensation. The 
first argument is that by nullifying the claimants' prejudgment attachments 
against Iran, "the President has taken a valid property interest ... for which 
compensation is due .... "306 In return for the destruction of the attachments, the 
President was obligated to provide a similar type of security of equal value. 307 In 
the present case, however, the President nullified three to four billion dollars of 
prejudgment attachments of Iranian assets, leaving to the claimants recourse to 
the Arbitral Tribunal with uncertain effectiveness and limited security.30M 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument for compensation in 
Dames & Moore v. Regan. The Court argued that no compensable property 
interest existed because the judicial attachments were awarded under a revocable 
license.309 A petitioner was therefore on notice that its attachment was subordi-
nate to the President's powers under the IEEPA.310 The Court concluded that 
because the President had the power to revoke the license under which the 
attachments were granted, the petitioners had not acquired a sufficient property 
interest to establish a compensation claim under the fifth amendment.311 
Second, claimants may argue that the portion of the Agreement which forced 
them to present their claims to a remote tribunal in which recovery is far less 
certain constitutes a compensable taking.312 By requiring the litigants to present 
their claims to the Arbitral Tribunal rather than allowing them to pursue their 
claims in domestic courts, the President did not provide a "fair trade."313 Accord-
306. Note, supra note 9, at 291 (1982). 
307. Id. See also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943). 
308. Howard, supra note 207, at 128. See also supra text accompanying notes 207-212. 
On May 2, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress that the Arbitral Tribunal had settled 
thirty-five cases as of that date, approximately one percent of the 3,730 claims presented to the 
Tribunal. At that time, awards paid to Americans totalled $37 million. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at D 
24, col. 5. 
309. Da11ll!s & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674, n.6. The "revocable license" was established by the following 
language of 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1983): "Unless licensed or authorized pursuant to this part any 
attachment ... is null and void with respect to any property in which ... there existed an interest of 
Iran." 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1983) provides: "The provisions of this part and any rulings, licenses, 
authorizations, instructions, orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked 
at any time." 
310. Da11ll!s & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673. 
311. Id. at 674, n.6. 
312. Note, Da11ll!s & Moore, supra note 11, at 384-85. 
313. Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd on other grounds, 
657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). In his opinion, Judge Duffy pointed out: 
The term "settlement" implies that the plaintiffs receive something of value in exchange for 
the termination of adjudicative proceedings in United States courts of their claims. In the 
instant cases, nothing has been received in exchange for the suspension of litigation in the 
United States. Instead, [the plaintiffs] ... must still seek satisfaction of their claims. They, 
however, have lost their rights to litigate in the United States courts and are forced to pursue 
their claims before an arbitral tribunal located in a foreign country. They also lose the 
guarantees of due process afforded by the United States courts as well as the right of appeal. 
Furthermore, ... the plaintiffs may only receive as little as 20 cents on a dollar SInce the 
identified claims of United States citizens against Iran and its instrumentalities exceed by over 
five times the amount Iran has put in the settlement fund. 
Id. at 88. 
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ingly, these claimants may wish to seek compensation from the United States not 
only for diminishing their capacity to satisfy their claims against Iran, but also for 
abrogating their right to sue Iran in domestic courtS. 314 In this respect, the 
compensation claims of the former hostages are similar to those of the contract 
claimants because the hostages would be seeking compensation solely for the loss 
of the right to bring a lawsuit against Iran.315 
The former hostages arguably have a valid tort claim against Iran for false 
imprisonment. 316 The Agreement, however, abrogates the right of the hostages 
to bring any suits against the Government of Iran.317 Because the Agreement 
constitutes a "taking" of the hostages' false imprisonment claim, the U.S. Gov-
ernment may be required to provide just compensation under the fifth amend-
ment. 3lB The hostages may have a stronger argument for compensation because 
the hostages, unlike the contract claimants, may not assert their claims before the 
Arbitral Tribunal. 319 
The contract claimants and the former hostages can arguably establish prima 
facie cases under tort and contract law against the Government of Iran. As long 
as the terms of the Agreement remain in force, however, neither group of 
litigants will receive full satisfaction of their claims. The former hostages are 
totally precluded from bringing suit against Iran and the contract litigants are 
limited to asserting their claims before the Arbitral Tribunal, in which only 
partial recovery would be available. 320 Accordingly, these claimants have been 
asked to sacrifice valid claims for the national purpose of ending the hostage 
crisis. If the purpose of the fifth amendment's Just Compensation Clause is to 
prevent the government from forcing some people to bear public burdens,321 it 
would be inconsistent with that amendment to deny compensation to these 
claimants. 
314. Note, supra note 9, at 291. 
315. The President's Commission on Hostage Compensation, see supra note 280, expressly addressed 
the question of whether the hostages were entitled to compensation. The Commission concluded that 
the hostages were not entitled to compensation on the basis that: (1) the hostages' release constituted 
adequate compensation for the loss of the right to sue Iran; and (2) the right to bring suit is of dubious 
value since past attempts to sue foreign governments in U.S. courts have been unsuccessful. President's 
Commission on Hostage Compensation, Final Report and Recommendations 11-12 (1981). The Com-
mission realized, however, that it was not an adjudicatory body and that the Court of Claims may be a 
more appropriate forum to establish whether hostages are due compensation under the fifth amend-
ment. Id. at 124. 
316. See supra note 279. 
317. Declaration, supra note 26, at para. 11. 
318. Several former hostages have brought suits in the court of claims against the U.S. Government 
on the theory that they are entitled to just compensation for the deprivation of their right to sue Iran. 
See Paul v. United States, 687 F.2d 364 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Cooke v. United States, No. 581-82c, 
slip op. (Ct. Cl. Mar. 3, 1983). 
319. The Arbitral Tribunal is competent to hear only commercial claims. See Claims Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 29, at art. II. 
320. See supra text accompanying note 207. 
321. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Iranian Government did not participate in the seizure of the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, its endorsement of the continued occupation of the 
embassy and the detention of the diplomatic personnel established its responsi-
bility for these actions. The U.S. Government responded to this crisis by freezing 
all Iranian assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The crisis continued until January 
19, 1981, when the United States and Iran entered the Declaration of the 
Democratic and Popular Government of Algeria. The major provisions of this 
Agreement restored Iran to the financial position it enjoyed prior to the freezing 
of the assets, terminated all suits between the two parties and their nationals, and 
established an international tribunal to resolve commercial claims that arose 
from the hostage crisis. 
There has been considerable controversy as to the international validity of the 
Agreement. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and Article 52 of the Law of 
Treaties constitute statements by the international community condemning the 
threat or use of force in treaty negotiations. These statements prohibit only the 
use of physical force. Although certain states argued that the prohibition should 
extend to acts of political and economic coercion, subsequent interpretations of 
the U.N. Charter preclude this application. To the extent that the actions of the 
Iranian Government constitute illegal acts of force, the Agreement must be 
considered invalid under international law. 
An invalidated treaty under Article 52 is considered void ab initio. The ILC 
provided, however, that this infirmity could be cured by subsequent ratification 
by the victim state. On February 24, 1981, President Reagan, concluding that it 
was in the overall interest of the United States to uphold the Agreement, issued 
the necessary executive order to ratify it. Although the Reagan Administration 
declined to evaluate the international validity of the Agreement, the effect of its 
order was to enforce the terms of the Agreement. Therefore, the infirmity was 
cured and the Agreement remains in force. 
The terms of the Agreement specifically preclude any suits by American 
nationals against the Government of Iran. Because the Agreement remains in 
force, American claimants are precluded from satisfying their claims. To the 
extent that the Agreement constitutes a "taking" of the claims against Iran, 
however, the U.S. Government is required by the fifth amendment to pay 'just 
compensation" to the claimants. 
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